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The Confrontation:
Tyronne first encountered James when they accidentally bumped elbows in
a crowded bar… An hour after leaving the bar, Tyronne and a friend spotted
James outside a local diner. They approached James slowly, and Tyronne
said: “Why did you bump into me back there?” James moved forward, shoved
him with both hands, and said: “Get out of my face.” …Without hesitating,
Tyronne then stepped forward and tried to shove James in the chest, but missed
and hit him in the face. James fell back slightly. He then turned around, took
a couple steps away from Tyronne, and appeared to reach for something in his
pocket. Tyronne quickly pursued James from behind and punched him in the
side of the head. James fell to the ground. Tyronne’s friend stepped forward
and kicked James…
INTRODUCTION
Racial bias may unconsciously alter the recollection of facts by judges and
jurors during all facets of the legal decision-making process. In delegating
fact-finding and decision-making authority to judges and juries, the American
legal system makes a supposedly elementary but unsupported psychological
assumption—that these individuals can cognitively process, evaluate, and
weigh the facts that were presented during trial.1 The accuracy of this
assumption recently has been challenged by behavioral law and economics
scholars, who have demonstrated that cognitive biases affect the way people
process information.2 Yet perhaps an even more vulnerable part of this
*
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See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making., 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 551 (2004) (stating: “The prevailing trial design
rests on the assumption that the complex and vast amount of testimony, presented over the
course of days and weeks, can be encoded, retained, and retrieved from memory in an
unaltered state.”).
2
These scholars aim to create a psychologically accurate model of legal decisionmaking. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). See also Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex
Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
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psychological assumption is implicated by systematic biases in memory recall.
Unlike most cognitive biases, which are assumed to be race-irrelevant,
unconsciously biased memory failures by judges and jurors may propagate
implicit racial biases through the legal process itself. Despite this challenge to
basic assumptions of legal decision-making, scholarship has not yet examined
whether judicial fact-finders and decision-makers systematically
“misremember” facts in racially biased ways. Nor has it adequately addressed
the link between implicit racial biases, the law’s quest for justice, and cultural
responsibility.3
In the past two decades legal scholars have identified a variety of ways in
which unconscious racial biases influence the legal process.4 One significant
methodology has involved examining the specific harms caused by
unconscious racism, such as the connection between unconscious racial bias
and acts of employment discrimination.5 Another methodology has involved
evaluating the unintentional biasing implications of legislation.6 As scientific
research methods continue to improve their rigor, we continue to learn more
about the implicit nature of racial biases and stereotypes and how they might
harbor immunity in the legal system.
Shifting gears momentarily, let us now return to The Confrontation, the
story presented at the beginning of this Article (but please do not look back at
the story just yet). Here’s a brief memory quiz about what you read. Do the
following facts accurately describe a piece of The Confrontation story you
read? (answer yes or no to each question) (1) Tyronne kicked James. (2)
James pushed Tyronne. (3) Tyronne tried to push James in the chest, but
missed and hit him in the face. Does the quiz seem easy to you? Well, it might
(check your answers in the footnote below).7 But make the facts a bit more
571 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227 (2003). Some cognitive biases, such as the hindsight bias, operate in close
connection with memory processes. By separating behavioral law and economics
discussions from my discussion of unconscious memory biases, I do not mean to imply that
other cognitive biases do not involve memory. To the contrary, many cognitive biases,
such as hindsight bias, availability heuristic, and primacy/recency effects, operate
inextricably with the human memory.
3
But see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Lawrence initiated this
discussion twenty years ago, but the cultural responsibility element of his famous article is
often overshadowed by discussions of his scientific claims about unconscious racism.
4
See Id.; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
5
See, e.g. Krieger, supra note __.
6
See Kang, supra note __.
7
Here are the quiz answers. Question 1 is inaccurate. Tyronne did not kick James.
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complicated (like a real case), and you might not remember as well.8 And
simply change Tyronne’s race from African American to Caucasian (and his
name to William) and you might even remember some facts differently. Not
convinced? Read on, or perhaps skip ahead to the empirical study I
conducted,9 which illustrates that these memory-driven unconscious biases
occur in a systematic fashion.
The empirical study I conducted investigated whether unconscious racism
affects how mock jurors remember legal facts. I asked people to read the facts
of legal stories (one is an expanded version of The Confrontation), briefly
distracted their attention,10 and then quizzed their memories of the facts. The
actors’ race served as the independent variable—people read about either
William (a Caucasian), Kawika, (a Hawaiian), or Tyronne (an AfricanAmerican).11 The results of the study demonstrate that the race of a civil
plaintiff or a criminal defendant can unconsciously cause people to
misremember a case’s facts in racially biased ways. For example, people who
read about Tyronne or Kawika were more likely to remember aggressive facts
from the “confrontation” compared to people who read about William.12 The
results also show that susceptibility to misremembering facts based on race
cannot be attributed to more overtly racist people —those who were susceptible
to racial misremembering were even sometimes less explicitly racist.
This Article, including the empirical study I conducted on juror memories,
brings together theories and methods from legal discourse on unconscious
racism and from psychology studies of implicit social cognition and memory
processes. It is structured as follows: Section II begins by offering
psychological proof of unconscious racism. It details recent studies in which
people’s unconscious racial attitudes and stereotypes are measured in novel, yet
methodically rigorous ways. Then it turns to legal discourse on unconscious
racism, and looks at how legal commentators have incorporated psychological
Tyronne’s friend kicked James. Questions 2 and 3 are accurate.
8
Research has suggested that jurors may not remember much more than half of
information presented at trial. See Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Does Jury
Deliberation Really Improve Jurors' Memories? 16 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 589
(2002)(finding a 60% accuracy rate of recall for mock jurors who watched a thirty-five
minute video of a case).
9
See infra Section IV.
10
With The Confrontation, I attempted to create a similar effect for readers of this
Article by pausing two paragraphs before asking the basic recall questions. Almost all
memory studies on recall provide a brief distraction task between presenting the task and
testing recall. See infra Section III for examples.
11
For one case, participants read an expanded version of The Confrontation. In the
other story they read about an employment termination scenario. Names and races were
similarly varied in the independent variable condition.
12
For detailed results, see infra Section IV.
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knowledge of these studies into critiques of legal theory, frequently by
focusing on the gap between legal tests and psychological reality. It highlights
the connection between unconscious racism, social justice, and cultural
responsibility that was present in early discussions on unconscious bias, but has
seemingly faded as the scientific model has improved and legal discourse
zooms in to follow. Finally, it notes that little or no empirical work has been
conducted to determine whether unconscious racial bias may affect judge and
juror memories of case facts.
Section III investigates the intricacies and errors of human memory
processes and discusses the intimate connection between memory and legal
decision-making. It describes several systematic flaws in the human memory,
including the generation of false memories. Empirical studies indicate that
people unconsciously create false memories in ways that are consistent with
stereotypes. Section III then turns to legally relevant examples of memory
failure. Thus far, discussions of failures of memory in the legal setting have
typically been limited to faulty eyewitness identifications, such as when the
“own race bias” manifests. Based upon the research discussed in Sections II
and III, I argue that unconscious bias likely affects legal decision-making by
altering judge and jury memories of case facts. Section IV details the empirical
study I conducted, which tested whether manipulating the race of actors in a
legal scenario would affect how accurately people recalled the story’s events.
The study showed that for some facts, simply altering a legal actor’s race
caused participants to remember certain facts or generate false memories in
racially biased ways.
Section V begins by discussing the relationship between implicit biases,
culture, and the law. It points out that implicit biases are not errors caused by
scientific quirks, but are meaningful manifestations of social and cultural
norms. It then discusses how the law’s quest for justice requires that implicit
racial biases not simply be addressed with a temporary debiasing framework,
but with a reflective, culturally competent mandate. Yet until a cultural
solution emerges through time, learning, and change strategies, we are stuck
with a system in which racial biases are transmitted implicitly through legal
decision-making process. Thus, the Section addresses a debiasing model that
might help moderate implicit memory biases, though only temporarily. While
such models risk overlooking the cultural responsibility for implicit bias, they
do hold some promise for minimizing harm. These temporary solutions
include (a) using debiasing techniques to block stereotypes and enhance
memory, (b) striving for more counter-stereotypic legal professionals and more
diverse juries, and (c) implementing more widespread procedural changes such
as juror note-taking and question asking. Section VI concludes.
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II. UNCONSCIOUS RACISM EXPOSED: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROOF AND LEGAL
DISCOURSE
Over the past decade, studies have deconstructed the complicated ways in
which the human mind maintains and manifests unconsciously biased racial
attitudes and stereotypes. Many of these studies have reached the same
conclusion—that unconscious biases are real, pervasive, and difficult to
change.13 Responding to the growing scientific proof of unconscious bias,
legal commentators have called for various types of reform.14 Reform minded
scholars have, for example, focused on the relationship between discriminatory
acts triggered by unconscious bias (such as employment decisions) and the
failure of legal rules to properly guard against or provide recourse for such
acts.15 These works often critique a substantive legal rule or construct (such as
the intent doctrine) in light of psychological evidence that indicates that such
rule or construct fails to truly understand the implicit nature of racism.16 While
such works have made great progress in discussing the relationship between
substantive legal rules and unconscious racism, less progress has been made in
studying how unconscious racism affects legal processes such as judicial
rulings and jury decision-making.17
In order to develop fully a theory on how unconscious racism might affect
judicial rulings and jury decision-making, three distinct areas of scholarship on
unconscious bias are helpful for review: (1) empirical psychological studies
that document various forms of unconscious racism; (2) detailed legal
arguments that call for reform of legal tests to match cognitive and racial
realities; and (3) cognitive science studies that show the fragility of the human
memory and connect memory failures to racial biases. This Section tackles the
first two of these areas, and Section III address the third.
A. Psychological Evidence of Unconscious Racism
Unconscious racism materializes in a variety of different forms and can
13

See, e.g., Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464
(1998); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1321 (2002).
14
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Krieger, supra note __.
15
See Lawrence, supra note __. Krieger, supra note __.
16
See Lawrence, supra note __. Krieger, supra note ___.
17
Some authors, such as those examining peremptory challenges, focus on the
intersection of substantive rules and legal processes. See Antony Page, Batson’s BlindSpot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U.L. REV. 155
(2005) (thoroughly outlining research on unconscious racism).
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affect the legal process in many ways. One possible, but troubling, way that
unconscious racism may manifest in legal decision-making is through biased
memories. In this Article, I argue that unconscious racism automatically
causes jurors (and perhaps even judges18) to misremember case facts in racially
biased ways. According to this argument and its underlying empirical
prediction, implicit racial biases are triggered in jurors and manifest
automatically through memory processes. This racial bias will distort case
facts in ways that are completely unknown to the juror but prejudicial to the
legal actor (for example, a criminal defendant or a plaintiff in an employment
discrimination claim). Thus, the argument draws upon research in two related
psychological areas, social cognition research and studies on human memory.19
Social cognition studies on bias explore the vast role of often automatic
cognitive processes in decision-making. Memory studies, including those
conducted using social cognition methodologies, reveal the vast powers of the
human mind, but also the systematic failures of the human mind’s ability to
recall certain facts. In combination with memory theories that reveal
systematic shortcomings of human recall, social cognition research can provide
empirically solid ground for the prediction that unconscious racial attitudes and
stereotypes are powerful and reliable enough to affect jury memories in biased
ways.
Implicit Social Cognition. Much of the existing evidence of unconscious
racial bias comes from the field of social cognition.20 Social cognition research
analyzes how people think about themselves and others, often using methods

18

In this Article, I argue that both juries and judges will likely be affected by
unconscious memory biases. Some readers might prefer to see me address only jury
decision-making in this context. After all, the empirical study I conducted focuses more
closely on mock jurors, not on judges. Nonetheless, in light of evidence detailing
systematic errors in a wide range of human cognitions, it is important not to leave judges
out of the discussion. Research on judicial versus jury decision-making biases appears to
corroborate the decision to include judges as possible unconscious propagators of bias. See
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for
Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005) (indicating that judges and jurors may well
suffer from the same errors of thought); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1251 (2005) (indicating that judges are not always able to disregard certain
information, even when required by their own rulings); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias,
42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1994); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777 (2001) (finding that judges, while sometimes less susceptible to biases than
juries, still exhibit systematic cognitive biases). For the sake of brevity and clarity, this
Article will only occasionally repeat “and judges” throughout.
19
Some research on memory falls under the umbrella of social cognition because of its
focus on cognitive processes. I review research in memory studies and errors, infra Section
III.
20
See, e.g,. Kang, supra note __.
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from cognitive psychology to investigate how the human mind works.21 The
area of social cognition thus includes work on a wide range of topics, including
attribution theory, schemas, the self, reasoning processes and decision-making,
memory, and attitudes.22 It should come as no surprise, then, that social
cognition research also examines stereotypes, biases, and inter-group relations.
In her groundbreaking work on unconscious bias and employment
discrimination, Linda Hamilton Krieger provided three overarching themes of
social cognition research on biases and stereotypes, each of which she related
to bias in the workplace: First, normal cognitive processes automatically
trigger stereotyping;23 Second, stereotypes and biases operate absent an explicit
intent to use them;24 and Third, “[p]eople’s access to their own cognitive
processes is in fact poor.”25 Thus, studies in social cognition have illustrated
that racial attitudes and stereotypes are both automatic and implicit. That is,
people possess attitudes and stereotypes of which they have little or no
conscious control or awareness.
A now famous example of social cognition research on unconscious racial
bias comes from research by Mazharin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald and their
colleagues, who began using the Implicit Association Test in the 1990s.26 The
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) pairs an attitude object (such as a racial
group) with an evaluative dimension (good or bad) and tests how response
accuracy and speed indicate unconscious and automatic attitudes and
stereotypes.27 In the computerized version of the IAT, participants sit at a
computer and keyboard and are asked to pair an attitude-object (e.g. Black or
White; man or woman; fat or thin) with either an evaluative dimension (e.g.
good or bad) or an attribute dimension (e.g. home or career; science or arts) as
21

SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991).
Id.
23
Krieger, supra note __ at 1188. For more on the automaticity of stereotypes, see
John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996); John A.
Bargh et al., The Generality of the Automatic Attitude Activation Effect. 62 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 893 (1992).
24
Id. at 1189.
25
Id. Kang labels this as “dissociation”-- the gap between conscious awareness and
implicit attitude. See Kang, supra note __ at 1513. See also Laurie A. Rudman, Social
Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of
Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUSTICE RES. 129, 133 (2004) (similarly summarizing the
automaticity, unintentionality and often unconscious nature of implicit biases).
26
See Greenwald et al., supra note __; Anthony Greenwald & Mazharin Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes. 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4
(1995) (discussing theories underlying implicit social cognition and the IAT).
27
Mazharin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117 (Henry L. Roediger, III, et
al., eds. 2001).
22
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quickly as they can.28 The speed at which the participants can pair the words
together (e.g. in one task, participants are told to quickly pair together pictures
of African American faces with positive words from the evaluative dimension)
is interpreted as the strength of the attitude (or in the case of attributes, the
strength of the stereotype).29 As described by Nilanjani Dasgupta and
Greenwald, “[w]hen highly associated targets and attributed targets share the
same response key, participants tend to classify them quickly and easily,
whereas when weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response
key, participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater
difficulty.”30 As demonstrated by Greenwald and his colleagues’ in their
landmark study (and in numerous follow-ups31), study participants consistently
demonstrate implicit attitudes and stereotypes in areas including race, gender,
and beyond.32 The time measurement variable used in the IAT allows
researchers to determine that it is implicitly harder for people to group together,
for example, images of Black faces with positive words than it is for them to
group together Black faces and negative words.33 The systematic display of
racial biases on the IAT has been confirmed by examining hundreds of
thousands of IATs taken in recent years on the IAT project’s website.34
Other than through the IAT, unconscious racism has been documented
using a variety of methodologies.35 One series of studies uses custom made
28

Banaji, supra note __ at 123.
Id. See also Greenwald et al, supra note __.
30
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800 (2001).
31
Recent research on the IAT is quite voluminous. One often contested area of study
on the IAT relates to the validity of the measurements. See, e.g., Alan J. Lambert et al., On
the Predictive Validity of Implicit Attitude Measures: The Moderating Effect of Perceived
Group Variability, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 114 (2005); C. Miguel Brendl et
al., How Do Indirect Measures of Evaluation Work? Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice
in the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 760 (2001).
32
See, e.g., Greenwald et al, supra note __; Anthony G. Greenwald & S. D. Farnham,
Using the Implicit Association Test to Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept. 79 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1022 (2000); D. Maison et al., The Implicit Association
Test As a Measure of Implicit Consumer Attitude, 32 POLISH PSYCHOL. BULL., 1 (2001).
Dozens of IAT tests are available at the Project Implicit Website,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Jul. 2006). See also Brian Nosek et al.,
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP
DYNAMICS 101 (2002) (reporting results from hundreds of thousands of IATs on the
popular on-line Website, including significant Black-White IAT results).
33
See Greenwald et al., supra note __; Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note __; Nosek
et al., supra note __.
34
Nosek et al., supra note __.
35
Jerry Kang, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Gary Blasi and others have described some of
these studies. See Kang, supra note __; Krieger, supra note __; Gary Blasi, Critical Race
29
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video games to examine the race-based phenomenon of “shooter bias.”36 This
bias emerges when participants play a video game that instructs them to shoot
perpetrators (who are holding guns) as fast as they can but not to shoot
innocent bystanders (who are unarmed). The “shooter bias” refers to
participants’ propensity to shoot Black perpetrators more quickly and more
frequently than White perpetrators and to decide not to shoot White bystanders
more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders.37 Studies have also shown
that participants more quickly identify handguns as weapons after seeing a
Black face, and more quickly identify other objects (such as tools) as nonweapons after seeing a White face.38 In these studies, participants are entirely
unaware that they have even seen a White or Black face. The quick flashing
image registers in the unconscious, but participants are not consciously aware
of the prime.39 The unconscious visual stimulus is enough to change accuracy
and speed of identification of the gun or tool in a racially biased way.
Faced with the results described above and the concern that “officers use

Studies: Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1241 (2002). See also Jerry Kang & Mazharin Banaji, A Behavioral-Realist
Revision of ‘Affirmative Action,’ 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
36
See Correll et al., supra note __ (2002); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception:
The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86 (2001); Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related
Potentials and The Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive
Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 120 (2006). Several of the original studies
on shooter bias were reviewed by Kang, supra note __.
37
Correll et al, supra note __ (2002); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 399 (2003). Most discussions of shooter bias focus on race in explaining the
Black-White result differences. Another possibility in these studies is reflected by the
concept of “colorism”. See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49
DUKE L.J. 1487 (1999).
38
Correll et al, supra note __ (2006), citing D.M. Amodio et al, Neural Signals for the
Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 88 (2004), C.M. Judd et al.,
Automatic Stereotypes Versus Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the
Payne (2002) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (2004); Payne,
supra note __ (2001; K. Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility
Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (2002).
39
This visual flashing technique is known as “priming.” A well known example of a
priming study is Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans. 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
797 (1995) (finding that priming racial identity affects standardized tests scores). For a
legal article on priming, see Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community
Values in Juries: How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 1059 (2005) (arguing that placing citizens on juries alters their cultural and
cognitive reference points and therefore changes their decision-making).
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race when making the decision to shoot,”40 researchers have continued to
investigate the roots of shooter bias. Studies have linked shooter bias to
culturally held racial stereotypes, which link Blacks to danger.41 This wellknown racial stereotype may even manifest in brain processes that moderate
responses to fear. In a recent study, Joshua Correll and his colleagues looked
at fluctuations in participants’ brain activity (known as “event-related brain
potentials”) while they played the shooter video game.42 According to Correll
and his colleagues, measuring event-related brain potentials can demonstrate a
distinction in brain response when people detect threats compared to when they
have a desire to control their response.43 Correll and his colleagues found that
as participants played the video game, racial bias manifested in their brains.
That is, participants’ brain activity showed more threat related brain activity for
Black actors than White actors (even for Blacks without guns), and more
control response activity for White actors compared to Black actors.44 These
brain responses then correlated with the participants’ performance—the more
biased brain activity they displayed, the more shooter bias they exhibited.45
Despite the concern raised by the study’s result, Correll and his colleagues
maintained optimism that future research will lead towards further
understanding and perhaps eventually lead to moderation of real world shooter
bias.
A third type of social cognition study revealing unconscious racism uses
word completion tasks to show how people more quickly associate
stereotypical words when stereotypes have been activated. These studies
demonstrate that people can more quickly complete word fragments, identify
stereotypic words, and pronounce stereotypic words when stereotypes have
been activated compared to when they have not been activated.46 For example,
a study by Daniel Gilbert and J. Gregory Hixon presented participants with lists
of partially completed words and asked them to complete as many as possible
during a short time period.47 Some of the words presented were stereotypically
associated with Asians, such as the word “polite” (written as POLI_E, so that
other words, such as “police,” could be formed during the word completion
40

Correll, supra note __ (2006) at 120.
Correll, supra note _ (2002); Correll, supra note __ (2006).
42
Correll, supra note ___ (2006).
43
These brain responses are known as P200 and N200 components, among others. Id.
at __.
44
Correll, supra note __ (2006) at __.
45
Id. at __. Interestingly, biased results in brain activity and shooter bias also
correlated with individual participants’ personal and cultural stereotypes.
46
Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do
They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation
and Application, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522 (2003).
47
Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 509 (1991).
41
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task).48 As they completed the task, participants were either exposed to a
Caucasian or Asian research assistant, whose only role was to hold up cards
containing the word fragments. The participation of this assistant was
hypothesized to be significant enough to activate racial stereotypes and thus
affect word completions. The hypothesis was correct. Participants who saw an
Asian assistant completed more words in a stereotype-consistent manner than
those who saw a Caucasian assistant.49 This study, and others like it, indicates
that implicit stereotypes manifest quickly and harmfully in a variety of
different ways, and that they seemingly do so automatically any time there is a
cognitive opportunity.
Moving beyond social cognition, other projects using broader social
science methodologies have revealed similar racial gaps. Marianne Bertrand
and Sendhil Mullainathan created fictitious character names and resumes and
studied how real world potential employers responded to “African-American
sounding names” compared to “White sounding names.”50 Using the fictitious
resumes, which also varied the experience of the imaginary applicant, the
experimenters responded to real help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago.51 The
results demonstrated that employers were more likely to call job applicants
with White sounding names than African-American sounding names. In fact,
when accounting for the dual influence of racial name sound and prior job
experience, the researchers found that a White name yielded as many callbacks
as an additional eight years of experience.52
Research in social cognition and related areas thus provides strong
evidence that implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes are triggered by
automatic cognitive processes in a variety of cognitive domains. Based upon
this compelling evidence, it would not at all be surprising if yet another
cognitive domain—that of memory—is similarly infected with implicit racial
bias. In Section III, I examine research on the human memory. Such research
illustrates a close connection between memory errors and racial stereotypes. In
48

Id. at 510. Other words included “short,” “shy,” “rice,” and “nip.” These words had
been obtained from a previous experiment in which people were asked to name their
stereotypes of Asians.
49
Id. at 511. The experimenters also tested how cognitive busyness affected
stereotype consistent word completion. The results reported in the text are for the nonbusy participants. When participants were distracted while performing their tasks,
stereotypes were moderated in word completions. However, when stereotypes were
activated in combination with busyness, participants were even more likely to apply
stereotypes.
50
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 994.
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the memory domain, as well as in implicit social cognition more generally, the
manifestations of implicit racial bias often conflict with a person’s explicit
attitudes about race. This conflict is illustrated by the gap between implicit
attitudes and explicit preferences.
Explicit Racial Preference, Implicit Bias and Social Dominance. One
particularly interesting characteristic of implicitly biased attitudes is that they
frequently diverge from explicit racial preferences. That is, overtly racist
people are not the same people who are implicitly biased.53 According to
Patricia Devine, “[e]ven those who consciously renounce prejudice have been
shown to have implicit or automatic biases that conflict with their
nonprejudiced values….”54 For example, Correll and his colleagues evaluated
“shooter” video game participants on game performance (an implicit measure)
and also asked them about their racial preferences (an explicit measure).55
Results showed that explicit measures of racial preferences were not correlated
with results for the video game.56 That is, people who exhibited greater
amounts of “shooter bias” were not the same ones who endorsed more racially
unequal preferences. A related and somewhat surprising finding is that implicit
bias sometimes occurs by members of the bias affected group. For example,
Banaji and Greenwald found that women and men both display implicit gender
stereotypes that are sometimes negative towards women.57
The relationship, if any, between implicit and explicit racial attitudes is
relevant to legal discussions of bias. If implicitly biased people are also
systematically explicitly biased, one could argue that the law’s current
protective focus on explicit and intentional discrimination might be sufficient.
The law could wait for explicitly discriminatory actions and provide sufficient
remedies. But if implicitly biased citizens are not always more explicitly
biased, then the law’s current focus on overtly racist acts overlooks a large
percentage of racially biased action. Thus, legal remedies focusing on explicit
actions (those that could be tied to discriminatory motive, for example) fail to
corral many cases of implicitly biased racial harms.58 The legal decision53

Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They?
Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757 (2001).
54
Id. But see Wilhelm Hofmann et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between
the Implicit Association Test and Explicit Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1369 (2005)(finding a general relationship between implicit and explicit
attitudes).
55
Kang, supra note __ at 1526, citing Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's
Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321 (2002).
56
Id.
57
Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in
Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1995).
58
See generally Lawrence, supra note __; Krieger, supra note __.
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making concerns are similar. If unconscious discrimination manifests through
the racially biased memories of judges and jurors, it would be important to
know whether people with stronger explicit racially hierarchical preferences
are more susceptible to its influences. If not, our legal process could be
propagating implicit racism with no safeguards in place.
One reliable predictor of explicit racial bias is the Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) scale. SDO is a measure that is designed to show an
individual’s preference for social hierarchy.59 According to Felicia Pratto and
her colleagues, a social dominance orientation is “the extent to which one
desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups.”60 The
scale that developed to test SDO has been accepted as a measure of explicit
racism and has often been used by social psychologists to predict anti-Black
racism as well as other explicit racial preferences.61 In the empirical study I
conducted on memory bias and race, infra Section IV, I employed the SDO
scale. I conducted this test in order to determine whether implicit memory
biases, if they do in fact exist, are related to explicit racial preferences.62 If the
two are related, such that implicitly racist jurors are also explicitly racist,
potential legal solutions might include employing explicit racism
questionnaires for jurors. Such screenings would thus block both explicitly
racist and implicitly racist jurors from participating in biased decision-making.
However, if implicit memory bias and explicit racial preferences are not
related, then dealing with such biases becomes significantly harder.
B. Connecting Unconscious Biases and Legal Theory
Most legal discussions of unconscious bias focus on the disharmony
between legal tests for discrimination (which require explicit, intentional
racism63) and the psychological reality of discrimination (which is often
unconscious, implicit, and does not meet traditional definitions of intent).64
These projects meaningfully incorporate empirical research on unconscious
racism research into substantive legal models, and teach us that legal standards
59

Felicia Pratto et al., Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable
Predicting Social and Political Attitudes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 741 (1994).
60
Id. at __.
61
To confirm validity, Pratto and her colleagues simultaneously tested their SDO
measure along with several racism measures. Id. Results indicated that the SDO measured
racism well. For each of these measures, there were significant correlations, indicating that
the SDO agrees with these other scales. To see the 14-item SDO dependent variables, see
infra note __ and accompanying text.
62
See infra note __ and accompanying text.
63
See Lawrence, supra note __ (describing equal protection’s intent doctrine);
Krieger, supra note __ (describing Title VII’s intent requirement).
64
See Krieger, supra note __ (critiquing the continuing between disparate treatment
and new knowledge on unconscious racism).
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must evolve towards understanding the true workings of racial bias. This
lesson is powerful. But there are other lessons we must learn from the new
research on unconscious bias. Most projects to date focus on the role of
unconscious bias in the discriminatory act or mental state of the perpetrator of
discrimination. They have not focused on the decision-making implications of
this new research. Specifically, few projects investigate how racial biases
unconsciously affect judges and juries.65 Nonetheless, the concept of
unconscious racism is well established in legal scholarship.
In what is credited as the most influential legal article on unconscious
racism, Charles Lawrence challenged equal protection discourse with a
psychological theory of unconscious discrimination.66 “[W]e are all racists,”
he proclaimed, and noted that “most of us are unaware of our racism.”67
Drawing upon research in both Freudian analysis and cognitive psychology,
Lawrence questioned how the Washington v. Davis68 discriminatory purpose
doctrine reflected an American culture that consistently propagates
discrimination, most of which is unconscious. The intent doctrine, Lawrence
argued, not only misses the mark because of the scientific reality of
unconscious racism, but in doing so fails to carry out the historical call for
justice central to the Equal Protection Clause.69 Now, almost 20 years after
Lawrence’s article was published, a heavily empirically focused field of
psychology supports Lawrence’s contentions more than ever, highlighted by
implicit social cognition findings. Even the current field of cultural
psychology, developed in the past two decades and a mere embryo in 1987,
was born from an idea similar to Lawrence’s discussion of culture-- that
cultural knowledge constantly shapes they way societal members think, feel,
and perceive reality.70 This new scientific field has begun to help deconstruct
65

Scholarship in the area of race and juries for the most part focuses either on the
ultimate decision of the jury, or on areas like eyewitness identification. These projects
often overlook the powerful workings of unconscious bias in the various stages of legal
decision-making. For a discussion of some of the existing work on race and eyewitness
identification, see infra note __ and accompanying text.
66
Lawrence, supra note __.
67
Lawrence, supra note __ at 322.
68
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
69
Lawrence, supra note __ at __.
70
See Richard A. Shweder, Cultural Psychology - What Is It, in CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY (James W. Stigler et al. eds., 1990); Joan G. Miller, Culture and the
Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961
(1984). See also Michael Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and
Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
949 (1994); See Li-Jun Ji et al, Culture, Change, and Prediction, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 450
(2001); RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY…AND WHY (2003). The role of cultural norms in
stereotype formation was also discussed by Eric Yamamoto. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO,
INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA
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cognitive biases (by illustrating their cultural limitations71) and lends support to
Lawrence’s theory that the cultural foundations of unconscious racial
discrimination must be investigated and understood.72
Outside of equal protection discourse, a major area of focus on unconscious
racism has been in the employment discrimination arena, where scholars have
debated not only whether unconscious racism actually affects employment
decisions, but also how employment law doctrine should change (or not
change) to incorporate a better understanding of how racism truly works. In an
early major project in this area, Linda Hamilton Krieger discussed subtle forms
of racism in Title VII employment discrimination cases, arguing that disparate
treatment jurisprudence incorrectly assumes motivational, rather than
cognitive, bases for discrimination.73 Stating that though employment
discrimination law’s assumptions about the nature of discrimination may have
been accepted historically by scientists, “these assumptions have been so
undermined, both empirically and theoretically, that they can no longer be
considered valid.”74 To illustrate the gap between the law’s focus on conscious
motivation and empirical evidence revealing unconscious racism, Krieger
reviewed social cognition studies beginning in the 1960’s, starting with
research demonstrating the automatic nature of ingroup and outgroup
categorization. For example, Krieger described a 1973 study by Billig and
Tajfel that indicated that people chose to allocate monetary rewards to ingroup
members rather than outgroup members, even when greater fairness and mutual

(1999). For legal articles discussing the intersection of cultural psychology and law, see
Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:
How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L. J. 601
(2005)(arguing for culturally competent legal rules); Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng,
Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s
Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195
(2004)(highlighting cultural differences cognitive biases, causation and foreseeability in the
U.S. and China); Justin Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences in
Behavioral Economics, available at SSRN (unpublished manuscript, May 2006) (arguing
for a cultural model of behavioral economics).
71
See Levinson & Peng, supra note __.
72
See infra Section V for a more detailed discussion of the cultural influences of
thought and decision-making.
73
Krieger, supra note __ at 1186-1211. See also Deana Pollard, Unconscious Bias
and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment
Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999) (arguing for a qualified evidentiary
privilege to encourage unconscious-bias testing); Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for
Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK L. REV. 1299 (1995) (sounding another early call
for incorporating unconscious discrimination into intentional discrimination standards);
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129 (1999)(discussing
“unconscious disparate treatment”).
74
Krieger, supra note __ at 1165.
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gain would have been achieved using other allocations.75 Bridging empirical
findings and anti-discrimination policy, Krieger suggested reformulating
disparate treatment doctrine to allow proof that group status played a role in
causing an employment decision. This change would alter courts’ focus from
an intentionality standard-- whether an employer intended that race make a
difference in an employment decision, to a causation standard-- whether race or
group status made a difference in the decision.76
Since Krieger’s groundbreaking work, employment law scholarship has
blossomed with discussions of unconscious racism.77 Ann McGinley claimed
that the Title VII’s proof constructs did historically and should now include
evidence of unequal treatment caused by unconscious discrimination, but that
courts have been unjustifiably tightening their analysis in ways that exclude
such evidence.78 Lu-In Wang carried forward Krieger’s focus on unconscious
racism, arguing that institutions are partly to blame for perpetuating a status
quo fraught with racial bias.79 Tristin Green argued that corporate culture itself
propagates racism in an unconscious way.80 Melissa Hart focused on how
existing Title VII remedies may actually provide redress for unconscious
racism manifested in employment decisions.81 Angela Onwuachi-Willig and
Mario Barnes critiqued Title VII in light of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s
study,82 arguing that constructed social meanings of race (such as someone
being “regarded as” Black), rather than race itself, should be used in legal

75

Id. at 1192-1193 (citing Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and
Similarity in Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1973)).
76
Id. at 1242.
77
See, e.g. Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005).
78
Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title
VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 419 (2000).
79
Lu-In Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (2004).
80
Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005).
81
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala.
L. Rev. 741, 745-49 (2005).
82
Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note __. An article that predates and contextualizes
Bertrand & Mullainathan as well as others’ research in the field is Mari J. Matsuda, Voices
of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991)(stating “[s]omeone who tells you they don't
like the way you speak is quite likely telling you that they don't like you”). Matsuda
addressed the role of prejudice relating to the way racial minorities speak and casts the
importance of voice and accent in (and beyond) a Title VII framework. While Bertrand
and Mullainathan did not test the role of voice and accent in hiring decisions, one might
anticipate that such a study would be worth conducting. For a recent article on the
changing form of discrimination, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race
Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006).
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applications of anti-discrimination laws.83 Samuel Bagenstos described the
compelling nature of unconscious racism literature and used it to evaluate a
“structural approach” to antidiscrimination law, which he claimed highlights
both the hope and also the challenges of discrimination.84
Legal scholarship on unconscious bias has not been limited to equal
protection and employment discrimination discussions. In other areas of law,
the prevalence of scholarship discussing unconscious racism has increased
greatly.85 Critiquing the FCC’s call for more local news by virtue of the 2003
Media Ownership Order and related “public interest” obligation, Jerry Kang
relied on social cognition research in claiming that local news broadcasts can
act as a “trojan horse,” a covert delivery mechanism that propagates the
implicit tools of racism.86 Kang systematically described social cognition
studies that indicate that the simple presence of racial cues can trigger
unconscious racial bias. For example, Kang reviewed research on the IAT,
detailed studies on shooter bias, and discussed a variety of other studies.87 He
then demonstrated how these accounts of unconscious racial bias are not
harmless attitudes with little or no connection to real world effects. Instead,
they can be directly linked to racially biased behavior, interactions and
outcomes, as confirmed by the racial discrepancies found in Bertrand and
Mullainathan’s study of racially stereotyped names and job interview requests,
among others.88 Furthermore, echoing Krieger’s prior message, Kang’s
account provided compelling evidence that people frequently have no
conscious awareness of their own implicit biases.89
Kang recently joined with Banaji to argue for a “fair measures” model of
affirmative action that incorporates knowledge from implicit social cognition.90
Advancing a new methodology called “behavioral legal realism,”91 Kang and
83

Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name? On “Being
Regarded” as Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White,
2005 WISC. L. REV. 1283 (noting that employers often use other criteria as proxies for race,
national origin, sex, religion, or age).
84
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
85
See, e.g. Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of
Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413-15
(2003); Andrew Elliot Carpenter, student article: Chambers v. Mississippi: The Hearsay
Rule and Racial Evaluations of Credibility, 8 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.L. J. 15 (2002)(arguing
that unconscious racial bias affects judicial determinations of witness creditability).
86
Kang, supra note __ at 1508.
87
Id. at 1525.
88
Id. at 1515. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note __.
89
Kang, supra note __ at 1508.
90
Kang & Banaji, supra note __.
91
This model seeks to expose and then remedy gaps between legal assumptions and
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Banaji addressed the unpersuasive nature of traditional debates over affirmative
action, pointing out that implicit social cognition research opens new avenues
for affirmative action discourse.92 Demonstrating the many ways that implicit
racial bias functions automatically and contrary to explicit preferences, they
proposed a system of “fair measures” that harnesses science as part of policy
development. Taking “fair measures” in response to societal implicit biases
requires counteracting or avoiding (if and when possible) the harmful effects of
implicit bias. For example, Kang and Banaji argue that “cloaking” social
category93 or removing stereotype threat triggers94 can help avoid known areas
of harm connected to bias.95 Kang and Banaji also use evidence of successful
bias reduction strategies to call for a new type of fair measure—using
“debiasing agents”.96 This fair measure harnesses bias reduction studies
indicating that minority role models and authority figures have the unique
ability to temporarily reduce (or at least suppress) implicit bias. In practical
terms, using a “debiasing agent” might include publicizing or hiring counter
stereotypical exemplars—such as women construction workers, male nurses,
Black intellectuals, and White janitors.97 If people recognize and associate
these debiasing agents as “anchored to that social category,” related biases and
stereotypes may become moderated over time.98
Another example of the growing scholarship on unconscious racism is
Antony Page’s critique of the Batson v. Kentucky three-step procedure for
attacking peremptory challenges.99 Presenting a broad array of evidence
detailing the automaticity of racial and gender stereotyping, Page challenged
the Batson test in light of social science research.100 Supporting Krieger and
scientific reality. Id. at [2]. Work by Lawrence, Kreiger, and others focusing on
unconscious motives fits nicely within this “behavioral realist model.” See also Levinson,
supra note __ (“Mentally Misguided”) (empirically evaluating the gap between legal
standards of “intent” and psychology reality of the way people perceive intentionality).
92
Id. at [7].
93
Blind grading is an example of a cloak already employed in many law schools. Id.
at [25]. The authors point out that such a step could help ameliorate effects such as those
demonstrated by Bertrand and Mullainathan’s job resume study. Id. at [25-26].
94
Stereotype threat describes the harmful effects that can be generated simply by
“priming” racial or other stereotype consistent constructs. For example, having African
American students identify their race before taking a standardized test has been shown to
lower their standardized test scores. See Steele & Aronson, supra note __. Avoiding
racial primes in such situations may not fully counteract the effect of stereotypes on test
performance, but it certainly can reduce it. See Kang & Banaji, supra note __ at [28].
95
Kang & Banaji, supra note __ at [25-32].
96
Kang and Banaji use a “fair measures” model instead of an “affirmative action”
model. See Id. at [4] (explaining the new terminology).
97
Id. at [39].
98
Id.
99
Page, supra note __.
100
Page also highlighted the faultiness of human memories when information is
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Kang’s work that pointed out the disconnect between conscious awareness and
implicit bias, Page argued that because attorneys are not aware of their own
thought processes, they may not themselves even know fully why they
exercised a peremptory challenge.101
Focusing on practical solutions to the unconscious racism problem, Jody
Armour discussed unconscious racism by distinguishing between stereotypes
and personal beliefs, and proposed using egalitarian (conscious) personal
beliefs to help overcome the effects of unconscious racism on juries.102
Armour argued that the best bias-combating strategies are not ex-post
constitutional law inquiries (as called for by the intent doctrine), but a practical
and scientifically grounded bias reduction strategy targeting legal decisionmakers.103 Despite Armour’s early call for bias reduction and for future
research on overcoming bias, social cognition research in the past decade has
not yet provided a universal bias reduction solution. In fact, overcoming
implicit biases such as those demonstrated by the IAT appears to be quite
difficult, and is particularly resistant to conscious efforts.104 Through the years,
however, scholars have kept Armour’s focus on overcoming bias alive. In one
such recent project, Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein suggested that perhaps
legal rules themselves can offer clues to dealing with biases in the legal
setting.105
Scholars have also incorporated knowledge of implicit racial bias into
political lawyering and social justice strategies. Calling for practical
applications of research on implicit bias, Gary Blasi argued that scientific
research on the human mind and racial bias should be understood and applied
by practicing attorneys and public policy advocates.106 As Blasi pointed out,
inconsistent with stereotypes, and pointed out that people can also have “‘memory
illusions’, in which [people] recall stereotype-confirming behaviors that never actually
transpired. Page, supra note __ at 220-221, citing Tadesse Araya et al., Remembering
Things That Never Occurred: The Effects of To-Be-Forgotten Stereotypical Information,
50 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 27 (2003).
101
Page, supra note __ at 160.
102
Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1995). Jerry Kang notes that Armour’s distinction
is roughly analogous to the difference between implicit versus explicit. See Kang, supra
note __ at 1508, note 81.
103
Id.
104
See Jerry Kang, supra note __ at 1562 (noting that while conscious control may not
counteract implicit attitudes demonstrated by the IAT, consciously altering “informational
and interaction” environment might help). Kang notes that implicit biases can be fought
with implicit methods. See Section V infra for a more detailed discussion of bias reduction
strategies.
105
Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
106
Blasi, supra note __ at 1245.
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understanding the true unconscious nature of bias can reshape the nature of
effective advocacy. Eric Yamamoto also recognized the importance of
understanding unconscious racial forces in a public policy advocacy setting.107
Examining the gap between legal efforts for social justice and scholarly
pursuits in critical race theory, Yamamoto argued that political lawyering must
become compatible with current perspectives on racism and bias, including the
complex role of unconscious racism in society.108
Perhaps reflecting successes of the sort advocated by Blasi and Yamamoto,
recent judicial decisions have begun to recognize the influence of unconscious
racial discrimination.109 In Chin v. Runnels, a criminal defendant convicted of
murder appealed the guilty verdict on habeus corpus grounds, arguing that
Chinese-American, Filipino-American and Hispanic-Americans had been
excluded from service as foreperson on the grand jury that indicted him.
Though the court denied the appeal in light of the “narrow standard of review
available,”110 Judge Breyer nonetheless discussed the evidence regarding
foreperson selection, which led to a “strong inference that the selection process
may not have been race-neutral.”111 In the San Francisco court’s jurisdiction,
no Chinese-American, Filipino-American, or Latinos had been chosen to be
grand jury foreperson during a thirty-six year period, a result that would have
amounted to a .0003% chance if evaluated based on the chances of random
selection.112 Breyer wrote: “the complete absence of grand jury forepersons of
Chinese, Filipino, or Latino descent over a 36-year period begs the question
whether unconscious stereotyping or biases may have contributed to the
exclusion of these groups notwithstanding the best of intentions of those
107

Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
Practice in Post Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) (recognizing the
continued power of Lawrence’s arguments and drawing on the cultural links to
discrimination).
108
Id at 830.
109
Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp.2d 891 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Two recent projects discuss
this case. See Darren Seiji Teshima, A "Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy": The Model
Minority and Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v. Runnels, 11 UCLA ASIAN
PAC. AM. L.J. 122 (2006) (arguing that “court officials unconsciously relied on the
stereotype of Asian Americans as unassertive and passive”); Sara R. Benson, Reviving the
Disparate Impact Doctrine to Combat Unconscious Discrimination: A Study of Chin v.
Runnels, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43 (2005) (predicting that evidence of severe disparate
impact plus unconscious bias will be enough will be enough for a plaintiff’s victory). A
more famous instance of unconscious discrimination being mentioned in the courts
occurred in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Georgia v. McCollum. Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now clear that conscious and
unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the
facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.").
110
Id. at 39.
111
Id. at 40.
112
Id.
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involved.”113 Other prominent juridical references to unconscious racism have
included references at the Circuit Courts114 and the Supreme Court.115
As legal scholarship on unconscious bias has grown, empirical studies have
consistently improved their methodology and continue to reveal a complex web
of implicitly racist attitudes and stereotypes.116 Nonetheless, legal scholars and
psychologists have generally overlooked how implicit racism explicitly effects
legal decision-making processes.117 This hole in legal discourse continues to
heighten the need for studies that connect unconscious racism with the legal
decision-making processes.
III. MISREMEMBERING LEGAL FACTS IN RACIALLY STEREOTYPED WAYS
It should come as no surprise that the human mind does not always act like
a sponge. In the legal setting, we hope but hardly expect that jurors exhibit
perfect retention of trial facts, particularly in complicated trials.118 Many
recent discussions of cognitive bias, for example, detail biases that are
intimately connected with judge and juror memory.119 Nonetheless, despite our
113

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42-43, citing EEOC v. Inland Marine, 729 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 469 U.S. 855 (1984); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.
2d 928 (7th Cir. 1993).
115
Id. at 43, citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)(O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
116
The evolution and debate over the IAT’s validity exemplifies the methodological
challenges that must be overcome in order to have “good science.” These challenges
increase the quality of subsequent projects.
117
Most studies on race in the law have focused on how race affects guilty verdicts.
These studies are focused more on the outcome than on the process. One potential way to
overcome this gap in research is through cross-disciplinary collaborations. For a few
examples of recent cross-disciplinary collaborations, see, e.g. Kang & Banaji, supra note
__; Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for
Legal Advocacy and Social Justice (forthcoming CAL. L. REV. 2006). A few collaborations
have tested psychological phenomena in legal scenarios. See Levinson & Peng, supra note
__ (2006).
118
See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 389 (1972) (J. Douglas dissenting,
recognizing that juror memory of trial facts is “imperfect”); M. Neil Brown et al., The
Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and Market System, 50 ST. LOUIS L. J. 425, 460
(2006) (questioning juror memories when scientific studies indicate that people can only
store 1% of information as long term memory). For a psychological study assessing juror
memory retention generally, see Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Memory
APPLIED 152
Monitoring in Mock Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
(1999)(demonstrating no correlation between mock jurors predictions and confidence in
memory and actual memory performance).
119
The hindsight bias and availability heuristic are two examples. For discussions on
these topics, see, e.g. Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note __.; Rachlinski, supra note __;
114
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understanding that jurors’ memory capacities are limited and that cognitive
biases persist, we still assume that these cognitive limitations are not embedded
with racial bias. As we have seen, however, social cognition research on
implicit bias has taught us that people experience difficulty in performing a
variety of simple cognitive tasks when basic racial constructs are active.120 It
should not be surprising, then, if we learned that when participating in cases
with racially diverse legal parties, jurors (and perhaps judges) unknowingly
misremember trial information in systematically biased ways.
This section explores research in human memory processes and presents
theoretical background for my claim that legal decision-making processes are
hindered by unconscious racial bias in memory retention of case facts. To
provide an overview of the relevant topics in memory, it explores a variety of
empirical studies on the human memory. These studies include examinations
of false memory generation, the interaction between false memories and
stereotypes, and memory errors known as “source monitoring error.” The
discussion then turns from proof of individual memory errors to address
whether individual errors will affect group decision-making processes. Taken
together, research in memory and decision-making indicates that memory
errors are normal, occur in stereotype driven ways, and can manifest in a
variety of ways that can ultimately affect legal decision-making.
A. Memory Errors Are Normal and Meaningful
Until the 1990’s, memory errors were frequently considered “noise” by
social scientists.121 As a result, experimenters usually overlooked whether
memory failures and false memories occurred systematically or whether they
provided clues as to links between false memories and stereotypes. In recent
years, however, scholars of memory and cognitions have learned a great deal
about the ways in which the human brain can systematically misremember
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715 (2003). Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1277 (1999); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994); April M.
Perry, Comment: Guilt by Saturation: Media Liability for Third-Party Violence and the
Availability Heuristic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1045 (2003).
120
See Banaji & Greenwald, supra note ___.
121
Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (2001). Not all early work disregarded the social
context of remembering. Bartlett believed that “remembering is an active process that is
guided and shaped by people’s knowledge and beliefs about the world.” C. Neil Macrae et
al., Creating Memory Illusions: Expectancy-Based Processing and the Generation of
False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63 (2002), citing FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A
STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1932).
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facts.122 According to Daniel Schacter, memory errors can be grouped into two
broad categories: forgotten information and distorted recollections.123 Errors
based upon forgotten information and distorted recollections both have the
potential to influence the way juries recall and “mis-recall” the facts of cases.
Yet, few memory errors have been investigated in the context of jury decisionmaking.124 Nonetheless, research on human memory processes has prospered
outside of the law. These studies have revealed two major themes: (1) people
are generally unaware of how their memories work;125 and (2)
misremembrances are not random-- they are normal, predictable and
meaningful.126 The first theme perhaps illustrates why legal scholars have
underutilized memory research in decision-making discussions (though studies
on eyewitness identification have incorporated it in detail127). The second
theme and its implications illustrates why legal scholars should pay more
attention to memory research.
Misremembrances occur outside of our conscious awareness. According to
C. Neil Macrae and his colleagues, people are “unwittingly duped into
believing that the contents of consciousness comprise an accurate record of the
experienced past, when in fact they do not. Instead, these items are false
memories, illusory experiences of events, actions, and utterances that never
occurred.”128 But why do false memories arise and what can we learn from
them? Memory researchers have found that false memories emerge regularly
in the course of a normally cognitive functioning and that they are explainable
by understanding the intricacies of the human mind.129 Some memory
researchers have posited that people unknowingly reconstruct the past in ways
that flatter their egos and serve to bolster their theories and beliefs about
themselves.130 Others, however, have documented that false memories emerge
122

See MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW
THE PAST (Daniel Schacter, ed. 1995).
123

MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT

Schacter calls these error categories the “sin of omission” and the “sin of
commission,” respectively. DANIEL SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE
MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS (2001).
124
But see Jeanine Skorinko et al., Stereotypic Crimes: How Group-Crime
Associations Affect Memory and (Sometimes) Verdicts and Sentencing (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author, June 2006). This study is discussed infra note __ and
accompanying text.
125
CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THEORY,
RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 228 (3rd ed. 2004).
126
Macrae et al., supra note __.
127
These studies are often lead by psychologists rather than lawyers. See infra note __
and accompanying text.
128
Macrae et al., supra note __ at 63.
129
Macrae et al., supra note __.
130
Macrae et al., supra note __ at 64, citing Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian
Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603 (1980); L.
S. Newman & R.F. Baumeiser, Toward an Explanation of the UFO Abduction
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in a broader range of situations.131 An investigation of these normal errors
reveals that they frequently occur because of the human mind’s heavy reliance
on stereotypes.
B. Stereotypes Drive Recall Errors and False Memory Generation
Both types of memory errors, those based on recall (forgetting) and those
based on distorted recollections (false memories) tend to emerge in situations
where stereotypes are involved.132 With respect to recall, memory stereotypes
facilitate ease of access of information. Thus, when people recall information,
they sometimes do so based on familiarity. But familiarity is code for
stereotype. Thus, people often recall stereotype-consistent information more
easily than stereotype-inconsistent information.133
The link between
Phenomenon: Hypnotic Elaboration, Extraterrestrial Sadomasochism, and Spurious
Memories, 7 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 99 (1996); and M. Ross, Relation of Implicit
Theories to the Construction of Personal Histories, 96 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 341 (1989).
131
See H. L. Roediger & K.B. McDermott, False Alarms About False Memories. 106
PSYCHOL. REV. 406 (1999); H. L. Roediger & K.B. McDermott, Creating False Memories:
Remembering Words That Were Not Presented in Lists, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 803 (1995).
132
Stereotypes, by their nature, are not always bad. In fact, they serve important
cognitive functions. See Page, supra note __ at 236. Nonetheless, the stereotypes I discuss
in this section are harmful stereotypes that relate race to undesirable characteristics.
133
I have oversimplified things. Stereotype consistent information is not always
recalled more easily. When people perceive events, if the information they perceive
deviates sufficiently from their expectations, they may actually recall it better than
stereotype-consistent information. Thus, while people easily recall stereotype consistent
information, sometimes they can more accurately recall stereotype-inconsistent
information. This seeming inconsistency should not be too troubling. Here’s an example:
Imagine you go to a baseball game. At the game, you notice that at different times, the
players are playing with different colors of baseballs: white baseballs and blue baseballs.
Later, you are asked what color baseballs they used. You might first recall the blue
baseballs—they deviated enough from your expectancy so that you encoded it more deeply
in your memory. But you will also easily recall the white baseballs. For the white balls,
you stored the memory loosely because it matched your mental expectancy. (Macrae et al.,
supra note __ at 65 discusses this encoding). Overall then, while stereotypes have
facilitated your memory of the white baseballs, your experience was unique enough to
generate a deeper level of memory storage for the blue baseballs. The baseball experience,
however, will not likely translate to memories of criminal legal stories. That is because,
even though we have race-based expectancies for certain crimes (e.g. violent crimesBlack), hearing about a White person committing a violent crime will not be as cognitively
surprising to us as seeing a blue baseball at a game. Thus, while it is true that stereotypeinconsistent information can sometimes be remembered more accurately (the blue baseball
v. the white baseball), for less cognitively surprising occurrences (the White violent
criminal v. the Black violent criminal), we will more easily revert to our memory
stereotypes. The results of the empirical study discussed infra, Section IV, appear to
confirm this explanation. But see Macrae, supra note __ (finding that, in the genderemployment context, participants were more likely to correctly remember names that had
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stereotypes and memory is even stronger when looking at memory distortions
such as false memories. Memory scholars have explained that people are more
likely to generate false memories when they are consistent with stereotypes
they have about the memory subject, actor and situation.134 The tendency of
false memories and stereotypes to go hand in hand emerges because people
tend to misremember things that are loosely stored in the brain.135 Stereotype
consistent information is stored in broad schemas rather than deeply encoded in
the human memory.136 When people recall certain information that is part of a
web of existing schemas and stereotypes, they may erroneously (and
unknowingly) create additional memories (of things that never happened) that
are consistent with those stereotypes.
Studies show how stereotypes are implicated both in memory recall and in
memory distortion. A recent study by Jeanine Skorinko and her colleagues on
memory recall demonstrates how racial stereotypes influence people’s
memories of crimes.137 In the study, participants were presented scenarios of
two stereotypically white crimes (ecstasy usage and identity fraud), two
stereotypically black crimes (crack cocaine usage and shoplifting), and two
stereotypically neutral crimes (marijuana usage and joyriding).138 The race of
the crime perpetrator in the stories was varied. After reading the stories,
participants were asked to recall crime information by matching the race of the
perpetrator with the crime. Results indicated that participants were more likely
to recall the race of the Defendant when the crime matched the racial
stereotypes of that defendant. For example, for hate crimes, participants were
more likely to recall the race of a Caucasian perpetrator than an African
American perpetrator.
The study shows that racial stereotypes can
systematically affect jurors’ (unconscious) recollections in the legal setting,
and that jurors may exhibit better recall of information about stereotypical
criminals and crimes.139
been paired with stereotype inconsistent occupations); C. Stangor & D. McMillan, Memory
For Expectancy-Congruent and Expectancy-Incongruent Information: A Review of the
Social and Social Developmental Literatures, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 42 (1992)(finding that
stereotype-inconsistent information is recalled more accurately under certain conditions).
134
Skorinko et al., supra note __.
135
Lenton et al., supra note __.
136
Id.
137
Skorinko et al, supra note __. A stereotype is “a cognitive representation of the
ideas, facts and images that are associated with a social group.” See Lenton et al., supra
note __ at 3.
138
Skorinko et al., supra note __. The researchers pre-tested race-crime stereotypes to
confirm the racial stereotype categorization.
139
Skorinko and her colleagues’ results indicated that racial minorities are not always
on the short end of the memory stick. For example, Caucasians were more frequently
remembered to have committed hate crime. The results of the study indicate that the biased
connection is not directly between race and memory, but instead it is between stereotype
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Skorinko and her colleagues’ study indicates that accuracy of recall can be
influenced by stereotype consistency. A study by Alison Lenton and her
colleagues expands the influence of stereotypes to include false memories.140
They presented participants with a list of words,141 some of which were
stereotypic of women (such as secretary and nurse) and others of which were
stereotypic of men (such as lawyer and soldier). After giving a distraction task,
participants were given a recognition test.142 Results showed that participants
used gender stereotypes in creating false memories. That is, they more often
(incorrectly) reported that they had seen gender-stereotyped words than non
gender stereotyped words. Results also indicated that these false memories
were elicited implicitly. Despite the nature of their errors, participants were
completely unaware of the gender stereotype theme of the word lists.143 The
researchers expressed concern that the implicit creation of stereotypeconsistent false memories may help to explain the “self-perpetuating nature of
stereotypes and their resistance to change.”144
Studies on the influence of “cognitive busyness” on stereotypes and false
memories indicate that even more false memories are generated when people
are under stress, distracted, older, or otherwise cognitively busy.145
and memory. Nonetheless, because of the deep connection between minorities and
negative stereotypes (and because violent crimes are stereotypical of African Americans),
the unfortunate effects of memory stereotype biases frequently falls upon African
Americans and other minority groups rather than on Caucasians.
140
Lenton et. al., supra note ___. See also Macrae et al., supra note (corroborating
these results for false memory generation).
141
All participants were shown fifty words that constituted gender neutral roles and
fifteen words that were gender stereotyped. Of these fifteen words, half of the participants
received female stereotype roles and half received male stereotype roles. To make the
gender context non obvious, the gender specific stereotype roles were mixed in among the
other fifty words. Id. at 6.
142
Id. at 6.
143
Id. at 10. The percentage awareness was slightly higher in the researcher’s first
experiment (of two). Nonetheless, the researchers considered the low awareness levels in
both experiments to support a theory of implicit activation of stereotype-consistent
information.
144
Id. at 12.
145
Macrae et al., supra note __ at 71. Stress, fatigue, and divided attention have all
been shown to impair a person’s recall ability. Even the aging process can lead to more
false memories. As people age, their frontal lobe brain function decreases, and they
become more likely to rely heavily on schemas at the expense of more detailed encoding
processes. Macrae et al, supra note __ at 72. This schema reliance translates into
stereotype consistent false memories. Older adults will thus generate more stereotypeconsistent false memories than younger adults. Age effects increase in severity along with
time-delay effects (delay between intake of information and the recall of that information),
another type of executive dysfunction. Macrae et al., supra note __, at 71 citing W.
Koutstaal & Daniel Schacter, Gist-based False Recognition of Pictures in Older and
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Recognizing that previous memory studies on stereotype consistency and false
memory had been tested using study participants whose cognitive energy was
exclusively on the task at hand, Macrae and his colleagues ran a study to test
how attention depletion affects false memories and stereotype consistency.
They employed a gender-occupation methodology that resembled Lenton and
her colleagues’ word pair study.146 However, in this study, both older and
younger adults were tested, and half of the younger adult participants were
given a simultaneous task to complete while they viewed the pairings of names
and occupations.147 The purpose of the simultaneous task (which consisted of
counting backwards by 3’s from 2000) was to split the participants’ attention
between the memory task and the counting task. Thus, the experimenters could
test how decreased attention affects false memories and stereotypes.148 As
expected, the results indicated that attention depleted participants were less
accurate in their memories than full attention participants.149 In addition, the
results showed that attention depleted young adults as well as full attention
older adults committed more stereotype-consistent memory errors than full
attention young adults.150
In discussing the implications of their research findings on false memories
and stereotype-consistency, Macrae and his colleagues surmised that “the
creation of false memories may provide yet another avenue through which
perceivers can bolster their pre-existing beliefs about the world,” an
implication they found “sobering.”151 In the legal context, the study’s results
are similarly troubling. Rarely are judges and jurors focusing on one piece of
information at a time. Age, multiple jury instructions, detailed factual

Younger Adults, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (1997). Many researchers link age
differences in false memories to frontal lobe brain function. Id. at 72. While older people
typically experience more memory errors than younger people, some younger people, such
as those with poor reading comprehension skills, have a propensity for false memories. See
Id. at 77, citing R. DeBeni et al., Increases in Intrusion Errors and Working Memory
Deficit of Poor Comprehenders, 52 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 305 (1998).
146
See notes __-__ and accompanying text.
147
None of the older adults were given the attention depletion. Researchers only
depleted the attention of a group of younger adults because they theorized that attention
depleted young adults make similar stereotype-consistent false errors to older adults giving
full attention. See Id. at 72.
148
Legal commentators can analogize attention depletion to the concept of cognitive
overload in juries. See J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury DecisionMaking After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301 (discussing cognitive
overload and other cognitive challenges in the context of post-Blakely increased juror
responsibilities).
149
Macrae et al., supra note __ at __.
150
Id. at 74.
151
Id. at 75.
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presentations, new, more complex legal standards,152 and conflicting testimony
are all likely to add to cognitive depletion. As a result, one can expect a
significant amount of stereotype consistent memory errors to manifest in a
legal setting.
C. Legal Memories Gone Wrong: Source Attribution Errors.
False memories are normal and can unconsciously propagate stereotypes.
But what types of false memories are likely to emerge in legal decision
making? One particular type of error, called source attribution error, may help
us understand how systematic memory bias may be implicated in legal
decision-making. While this memory error has sometimes been applied to
eyewitness memory faults,153 it has not been discussed in the context of juror
memory errors and unconscious racial bias.
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman conducted an early and influential study
that illustrated a source attribution error in the “telephone game.”154 In the
study (which was not originally intended to be a memory study but a study
about rumors), participants viewed a picture of a two passengers on a streetcar
(one passenger was White and one was Black). In the picture, the White
passenger holds a razor blade and the Black passenger is empty-handed.
Participants were then asked to describe the picture to other participants (who
did not see the picture). As participants in the study told and re-told the story
to others, the story changed. After the story had been re-told several times,
participants reported that the Black passenger, not the White passenger held a
razor blade. The results of the study (which had originally focused on retelling
accuracy) demonstrated a source attribution error—the razor blade possession
shifted from one memory source (the White passenger) to another (the Black
passenger). Was it a coincidence that the source attribution error reflected
stereotype consistency? Quite unlikely. Rather, the study more likely stands
for the proposition that source attribution errors may be triggered by
stereotypes.155
Source attribution errors occur when a person places the source of one
memory into another setting, creating an incorrect source of another
152

See e.g. Prescott & Starr, supra note __.
See infra note ___ for a brief discussion of studies investigating eyewitness
memory.
154
GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO J. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947).
155
See Skorinko et al, supra note __ at 6. A recent study by Richard Marsh and his
colleagues supports this proposition. In that study, the researchers found that participants
attributed sources of memory in a manner consistent with gender and sexual orientation
stereotypes. Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias SourceMonitoring Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148 (2006).
153
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memory.156 In the context of eyewitness identification, the concerns created by
source attribution errors are powerful and easy to conceptualize.157 A victim of
a crime or an eyewitness might unknowingly transfer the memory of a person
or face into another context.158 Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing in
1995, for example, 159 a massive search commenced for John Doe #2,160 a
“young square-faced man with dark hair and a stocky build wearing a blue and
white cap.”161 John Doe #2’s description came from a mechanic who had seen
Timothy McVeigh rent a van before the bombing. After a massive search, it
turned out that there was no John Doe #2. The mechanic had simply confused
another van rental transaction with McVeigh’s rental. The other rental
transaction had involved two men, one of whom resembled McVeigh. The
second man was a stocky square-faced man. The mechanic had unconsciously
transferred memory of John Doe #2 from one context to another.162
156

See Schacter, supra note __.
Francis A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of "Unconscious Transference": The Latest
Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 107, 123-24 (1996). For a comprehensive discussion of memory issues in eyewitness
identification, see Ralph Norman Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering, and
Reporting Events, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1057 (2000). In addition to studies on
source attribution errors, studies on memory in eyewitness testimony have also connected
memory errors to racial bias. These studies indicate that memory errors may occur
particularly when perpetrators are out-group members. Another prominent discussion of
memories in the eyewitness context is the role of repressed memories, including the
reemergence of repressed memories through the use of hypnosis. A wide variety of
psychological and legal articles have discussed repressed memories. See, e.g. JENNIFER J.
FREYD, BETRAYAL TRAUMA: THE LOGIC OF FORGETTING CHILDHOOD ABUSE (1996);
Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 518 (1993).
The “own race bias,” for example, demonstrates that people can discriminate better
between faces of their own ethnic group than faces of other ethnic groups. Bartol & Bartol,
supra note __ at __. For a discussion of own race bias in the context of legal rules, see
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 934 (1984). Research has repeatedly found that White participants are more accurate
in identifying White faces than Black faces. These studies have not found a connection
between explicit racial attitudes and memory of out-group races, indicating that own-race
bias operates implicitly. A meta-analysis of thirty years of studies on own-race bias
confirmed that racial attitudes do not serve as predictors of own-race bias. Christian A.
Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory
for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 3 (2001) (analyzing data
from 39 separate studies on own-race bias). When analyzed in the context of juror memory,
these studies suggest not only that juror memory may be subject to unconscious memory
biases, but also that such biases cannot be predicted by identifying explicitly biased jurors.
158
These types of errors are well documented and have been discussed in terms of
evidentiary laws. Gilligan et al, supra note __.
159
This example was given by Schacter, supra note __ at __.
160
Timothy McVeigh was John Doe #1. Id.
161
See Schacter, supra note __ (giving a more detailed description of this Oklahoma
City bombing attribution error).
162
Id. at 92. According to Schacter, the source of the mechanic’s memory error was
157

30

Forgotten Equality

25-Aug-06

If source attribution errors can cause faulty eyewitness identifications, they
can also cause jurors to falsely recall case facts by attributing evidentiary facts
to the wrong party without recognizing it (as illustrated by Allport and
Postman’s study). Recall The Confrontation story from the beginning of this
Article. In attempting to remember the story, some readers might have
believed that Tyronne kicked James. Such an error would constitute a source
attribution error (because Tyronne’s friend kicked James, not Tyronne).
Memory researchers have pointed out that, as demonstrated by Allport and
Postman’s results, source attribution errors can systematically occur in ways
driven by stereotypes. Using an analogy from West Side Story, Jeffrey
Sherman and his colleagues noted that “stereotype driven errors in source
memory may lead you to falsely remember that the Sharks rather than the Jets
committed homicide…”163
D. Connecting Memories to Decision-Making
If implicit biases affect judge and juror memories of case facts, do these
biases also affect legal outcomes?164 Making such a connection requires
linking the cognitive process of memory to decision-making itself. Put simply,
if biased memories do not create biased outcomes, our concern should be
moderated. To date, no empirical studies have tested the effects of implicitly
biased memories on legal decision-making outcomes. Inside and outside the
legal setting, however, the crucial role of memories in decision-making has
“unconscious transference.” Francis Gilligan and colleagues clarify that unconscious
transference is closely related to source attribution errors, which they claim is the more
accurate psychology terminology. See Gilligan et al., supra note __ at 116. For purposes
of this Article, to avoid confusion in terminology, I use source attribution error and
unconscious transference interchangeably. According to Elizabeth Loftus, source
attribution errors result from the malleable nature of human memory and allow
eyewitnesses to confidently conclude that the wrong person committed a crime. Id., citing
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). Unconscious transference is a well
documented and accepted phenomenon. According to Bartol and Bartol, two surveys
indicate that between 81-84.5% of psychologists believe that evidence of unconscious
transference is reliable enough to be presented in court. Id., citing Saul M. Kassin et al, The
“General Acceptance” of Psychologcial Research on Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey of
the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989); Saul M. Kassin et al., On The “General
Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001).
163
Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Bearing False Witness Under Pressure: Implicit and
Explicit Components of Stereotype-Driven Memory Distortions, 21 SOC. COGNITION 213,
243 (2003). The researchers point out the legal dangers of such a source transference,
focusing on faulty eyewitness identification.
164
This question resembles an early challenge to implicit social cognition work. The
challenge questioned the connection between implicit attitudes and behavior. That is, do
people with implicit biases act on them? Evidence has indicated that implicit bias does
lead to action. See Kang, supra note __.
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been well documented.165 Thus, it is quite likely that biased memory processes
result in biased legal decisions.
Cognitive psychological research has demonstrated the importance of
factual memory and recall to a variety of decision-making models. Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie developed a “Story Model” of jury decisionmaking, a well regarded framework of jury information processing and
decision-making that focuses on understanding how jurors process
information.166 According to Pennington and Hastie, the first step for jurors in
information processing is constructing an “explanatory model” (or story) of
case facts.167 During the next step, jurors attempt to memorize and understand
the judicial instructions of verdict categories.168 Finally, they attempt to fit
their “story” into the judicial instructions.169 Because of the prominent role of
story formation in this decision-making model, if memory errors taint the
content of the story when it is formed or recalled, they will likely be preserved.
These errors will remain in the stories as jurors incorporate the story into the
judicial instructions and ultimately make decisions.170
Research outside of the legal field supports the argument that memory
functioning is crucial to decision-making. Focusing on models in the decision
sciences (sometimes called “human judgment and decision making”), Elke
Weber and his colleagues argued that memory insights, particularly related to
the encoding process of information into memory, are crucial to judgment and
165

Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological
Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
90, 95 (1990). See also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation Based Decision
Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 521 (1988); Michael R. P. Dougherty et al., Memory as
a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT
AND DECISION RESEARCH 125 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds., 2003) (noting
that previous models often fail to account for a variety of empirical findings linking
memory to various facets of decision-making).
166
See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1138 (2001) (calling Pennington and Hastie’s theory a “widely
accepted” model of jury decision-making). See also Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo,
Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in
Civil Litigation, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (2003) (confirming, critiquing and expanding
Pennington & Hastie’s model); Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" in Civil Jury Judgments,
32 MICH. J. L. REF. 227 (1999).
167
Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ (1990). See also Pennington & Hastie, supra
note __ (1988).
168
Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ (1990) at __.
169
Id.
170
See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors Decisions, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 991,
1007 (claiming that juror emotional processes can influence memories and thus stories that
jurors construct).
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decision-making models.171 Highlighting the importance of a memory-focused
inquiry into decision-making, Weber and his colleagues proposed that
“memory can be used the way physicists use cloud chambers: to study
otherwise unobservable events via the residue they leave behind.”172 In this
vein, this Article examines memories for racial residue in the legal context.
Another decision-making model that highlights the importance of memory
is one developed by Michael Dougherty and his colleagues.173 This model
contains three stages: (1) representational properties, (2) retrieval from
memory, and (3) experience and domain knowledge. The first two of these
stages illustrate that memory may fundamentally alter decision-making at
multiple points in the legal decision-making process.174 The representation
stage focuses on two complementary ways in which memory is stored in the
mind, instance-based and abstraction-based representations. In instance-based
representations, individual memories are encoded and stored separately as
specific memory traces.175 In abstraction-based representations, summaries of
stimuli or events are stored such that only “important” information is encoded
(smaller details are lost).176 According to Dougherty and colleagues, both
types of representations are important for understanding and predicting
ultimate decisions. Poor encoding quality on instance-based representations
171

Elke U. Weber et al., And Let Us Not Forget Memory: The Role of Memory
Processes and Techniques in the Study of Judgment and Choice, in DECISION MAKING,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY
33, 35 (J. Busemeyer et al., eds 1995) (citing concern in the judgment and decision-making
field that the focus of the field may be too narrow). Weber and his colleagues point out
that Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory includes an “editing phase” that was based
upon memory and coding operations. Id. at 36.
172
Id. at 36-37.
173
Michael R. P. Dougherty et al., Memory as a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision
Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 125 (Sandra
L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds., 2003)(noting that previous models often fail to
account for a variety of empirical findings linking memory to various facets of decisionmaking). For another model of decision-making that highlights the inclusion of memory,
see Valerie F. Reyna et al., Memory, Development, and Rationality: An Integrative Theory
of Judgment and Decision-Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND
DECISION RESEARCH 201 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds., 2003). See also
Elke U. Weber et al., Beyond Strategies: Implications of Memory Representation and
Memory Processes for Models of Judgments and Decision-Making, in RELATING THEORY
TO DATA: ESSAYS ON HUMAN MEMORY IN HONOR OF BENNET B. MURDOCK 75 (W. E.
Hockley & S. Lewandowski, eds. 1991).
174
Dougherty and his colleagues argue that all three stages connect memory to
decision making. For purposes of this Article, I only focus on the first two. One could,
however, connect the experiential stage to legal decision-making, particularly when
examining the role of memories in judges’ decisions.
175
Id. at 131.
176
Id.
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can have major effects on later judgments.177 For example, it can lead people
to underestimate the frequency of stimuli or to miscalculate probability
judgments.178 Abstraction-based representations, as relied upon in Pennington
and Hastie’s story-based model, similarly can lead to variability in decisionmaking problems.179 One example of the impact of abstraction-based
representations on ultimate decisions comes from the generation of cognitive
errors such as framing effects.180
The retrieval from memory stage focuses on biases and errors that arise
when people recall information. These errors, in turn, can affect decisionmaking. For example, retrieval can be compromised by ordering effects, such
as the primacy effect. An early example of primary effect was demonstrated
by research on people’s impressions of others. This research showed that
people develop more positive impressions of others when they learn positive
information about those people ahead of negative information.181 When they
learn negative information first, more negative impressions follow, even when
the total mix of information is the same. This phenomenon emerged because
of a memory bias—people are most likely to remember whatever information
comes first. Memory biases can therefore affect decision-making in the
retrieval from memory stage. At each of the first two stages of Dougherty and
his colleagues’ model, then, memory errors have a systematic effect on
decision-making.
In light of the compelling research linking memory to decision-making, the
connection between implicit memory biases and legal decision-making
processes becomes even more intimate. If implicit memory biases affect judge
or juror encoding or retrieval of information, such effects are likely to carry
177

Id. at 133.
Id. at 133.
179
Id. at 136, citing Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ (1988)
180
Id. at 137, citing V.F. Reyna & C.F. Brainerd, Fuzzy Trace Theory of Framing
Effects in Choice, Presented at the 30th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomics Society,
Atlanta (1989); V.F. Reyna & C.F. Brainerd, Fuzzy Trace Theory and Framing Effects in
Choice: Gist Extraction, Truncation, and Conversion, 4 J. BEHAV. DEC. MK’G 249 (1991).
Various legal scholars have focused on the legal impact of framing effects. See, e.g., Chris
Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI L. REV. 163
(2000); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures
Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797 (2005). These scholars,
however, generally overlook the role of abstraction-based memory processes in framing
effects.
181
Id. at 141 (citing N. H. Anderson & S. Hubert, Effects of Concomitant Verbal Recall
on Order Effects in Personality Impression Formation, 2 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 379 (1963)).
178
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through to legal decision-making.
E. Can Deliberations Cure Memory Errors?
The research discussed above indicates that memory plays an integral role
in human decision-making processes. Nonetheless, most of the studies
described have focused on individual decision-making. While judges (except
those who sit on panels) certainly engage in individual decision-making, juries
make decisions as groups. Thus, before concluding that individual memory
biases affect legal outcomes, one must first look at research on the relationship
between individual and group decision-making.182 Such scholarship indicates
that group decision-making processes typically do not alter already completed
individual decision-making. As a result, memory errors made by individual
jurors are preserved rather than corrected.183
Pennington and Hastie’s “Story Model” of decision-making helps us
evaluate whether jury deliberations are likely to correct memory biases. This
model has identified two styles of juries, those that are “evidence driven” and
those that are “verdict driven.”184 One style of jury has an opportunity to
correct memory errors while another does not. According to Pennington and
Hastie, “evidence-driven” juries first come to agreement about the story in
order to reconcile different juror stories about what happened.185 Juries that
182

A variety of studies have investigated whether racial discrimination occurs in legal
verdicts. Most of these studies focus on the outcome of the legal question, whether or not a
criminal defendant is guilty or not guilty, but do not focus on bias in the decision-making
process. Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth quantitatively evaluated the scholarship
on race and legal decision-making. Samuel R. Sommers & Pheobe C. Ellsworth, How
Much Do We Really Know about Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and
Research, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003). Their study indicated that existing studies on
jury decision-making and race reveals “less…than meets the eye.” Some studies, however,
reveal outcome differences based on race. See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock
Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 39 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 621 (2005) (finding small but significant differences in race effects on verdicts);
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Descrimination: Measuring the Effects of
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993). Studies outside of the legal
context reveal a complex relationship between decision-making in racial contexts and the
(non-racial) explanations given by decision-makers. See Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed
Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision
Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36 (2006).
183
In some cases, jury deliberations have been argued to aggravate, rather than
ameliorate, biases. See Prescott & Starr, supra note __. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Group
Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
962 (2005) (discussing a variety of problems that arise in group deliberative processes).
184
Pennington & Hastie, supra note __.
185
Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ at 99 (1990). See also REID HASTIE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
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engage in this type of decision-making process might have the cognitive
opportunity to correct memory errors. “Verdict driven” juries, on the other
hand, skip the early story stages and move ahead to the verdict stage. In doing
so, they likely preserve individual juror’s stories of the evidence, thus
solidifying memory errors that have been incorporated into their stories.
Overall then, Pennington and Hastie’s model indicates that some jury types
have an opportunity to correct memory errors, but others do not.
Research by Mary Pritchard and Janice Keenan indicates that jury
deliberation often fails to correct memory errors, casting doubt upon whether
“evidence driven” juries take advantage of the opportunity to improve
memories during the story reconciliation stage. Interested in how successful the
jury deliberation process is in correcting false memories of individual jurors,
Pritchard and Keenan examined whether deliberations worked to reduce or
eliminate memory errors.186 They measured how event memories were initially
formed and how they changed during the course of deliberations. Results
indicated that deliberation only slightly improved memory errors (even though
participants only accurately remembered 60% of the information tested)187 and
that the most vocal and dominant jurors were not always the ones with the most
accurate memories.188 They also found that those jurors who were more likely
to change their verdict were jurors with less confidence in their memories, but
not those with the least accurate memories.189 The researchers concluded that
courts’ assumptions that deliberation improves memory “is only weakly
supported.”190 Another study by Pritchard and Keenan indicates that we cannot
rely on individual jurors themselves to catch or correct their memory errors.191
In that study, Pritchard and Keenan tested mock juror memory accuracy as well
as confidence in the accuracy of their memories.192 Results indicated that
jurors who were the most confident in their memories were not the most
accurate.193 These studies indicate that if individual juror memories are
186

Pritchard & Keenan, supra note __ (2002).
Id. at 600. This 60% may be significantly higher than in real trials. As Pritchard
and Keenan point out, the trial they used in the study lasted only thirty five minutes long
and participants were college students (who “tend to have better memories than the typical
jury pool”).
188
Id at 595, 600.
189
Id at 600. The authors concluded that the assumption that jury deliberation
190
Id.
191
Pritchard & Keenan, supra note __ (1999).
192
Pritchard & Keenan, supra note __ (1999).
193
Id. at 161. Participants, however, were fairly accurate in their ex-post assessments
of their memories. These results mirror one of the major flaws encountered in eyewitness
testimony—that jurors erroneously assume that confident eyewitnesses are the most
accurate ones. See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience,
82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998).
187
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tarnished by unconsciously biased recall errors and false memories, then
neither self monitoring nor jury deliberation are likely to significantly improve
the problem.
Taken as a whole, research on human memory processes indicates that
people systematically and unconsciously make stereotype-driven memory
errors. It also indicates that these errors are likely to affect decision-making
and that the nature of group deliberations is unlikely to help.
IV. FORGOTTEN EQUALITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
In order to test whether unconscious racial bias manifests in the accuracy of
juror memories, I employed an empirical study designed to examine whether
people’s recollections of legal stories are shaped by the race of the actors in the
stories. The test revealed a variety of systematic and implicitly biased memory
errors. This Section presents the methodology and results of the study.
Before conducting the study, I made the following hypotheses:
(1) The accuracy of participants’ memories in recalling legal stories would
be affected by the race of the actors in the stories;
(2) Participants would make memory errors in a manner harmful to African
Americans and Hawaiians but helpful to Caucasians; and
(3) Participants who exhibit more explicit bias would not necessarily be
those who exhibit more implicit bias.
A. Methods
Participants. 153 undergraduate students in a psychology course at the
University of Hawai'i participated in the study for course credit. The average
age of the participants was 21.74 years. 71.2% of the participants were
women.
Materials. Participants read two unrelated stories. One story described the
circumstances surrounding a fistfight (a story I called The Confrontation194),
and the other detailed circumstances surrounding an employee who was
terminated. After reading the stories, participants returned the stories to an
experimenter and were given a questionnaire that contained a brief “distraction
task.” The distraction task was designed to take approximately 5-10 minutes,
and was composed primarily of word completion questions and analytical
194

The story name or even the existence of a story name, of course, was not part of
information given to participants.
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reasoning questions. The goal of the distraction task, as is common in memory
recall studies, was to eliminate immediate memory effects (those that would
only linger a few minutes). After completing the distraction task, participants
were asked to answer questions about the stories they read. The stories were:
Story 1:
Brenda, a 28 year old Caucasian woman, worked as a “purchasing clerk”
in the corporate offices of Big Burger Company, a small chain of hamburger
joints. Brenda represented the second generation of her family to work at the
offices of Big Burger Company. In fact, her father was once employee of the
month at the company. Brenda’s job required that she work five days a week
for eight hours a day. She was permitted one hour for lunch and two fifteen
minute breaks. Another employee, Jimmy, shared a cubicle with Brenda.
Jimmy, who worked for the public relations department as a marketing clerk,
was occasionally sloppy with his work. Sometimes, when he was unable to
complete the work assigned, Brenda helped him with his projects, which
usually involved using the web to generate internet publicity and create new
business. Jimmy and Brenda even occasionally dined together in Big Burger’s
company cafeteria, where Jimmy always ate burgers and french fries.
While at her desk, in addition to conducting her duties, Brenda frequently
surfed the web and wrote an internet “blog,” a journal that chronicled her
daily life as a corporate purchasing clerk. Surfing the web for personal
business was listed as a prohibited activity by the Big Burger Employee
Handbook. Despite her web surfing, Brenda routinely worked longer hours
than was required of her, and always finished her assigned work. In addition,
her high quality work was documented by her boss, who consistently filed
reports praising her hard work, intellect, and dedication. Brenda did,
however, occasionally make long-distance phone calls from her work phone.
She also occasionally let her friend, who worked in the shipping department,
come and surf the web on her computer, so long as he did it during his fifteen
minute breaks.
Brenda had an employment agreement with Big Burger Company that
stated: “The Company shall not terminate the Employee without good cause,
such as the commission of a felony or other morally questionable actions.”
One day, Brenda posted a web blog that said: “Big Burgers should be called
Blah Burgers. The burgers are so darn boring I wouldn’t eat them if I didn’t
get them for free.” Even though her blog was anonymous, Jimmy saw her
posting the message. The next day, the company announced that Brenda’s boss
had been promoted to another office. Brenda’s new boss came and introduced
himself. He told Brenda that his performance expectations were extremely
high for her, and that he wouldn’t tolerate substandard work or any other
insubordination. Brenda was fired five days later. At first she received no
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explanation, but was later sent a letter stating that she failed to meet the
“expected standards of employee conduct.”
Story 2:
William, a 23 year old Caucasian man, first encountered James, a 30 year
old plumber, when they accidentally bumped elbows in a crowded bar. In the
accident, James spilled beer onto William’s shirt and shorts. William was
angry but the encounter ended when a bar employee took him by the arm and
led him away. As William walked away with the bar employee, James smiled
at William and chuckled. An hour after leaving the bar, William and a friend
spotted James outside a local diner. They approached James slowly, and
William said: “Why did you bump into me back there?” James said nothing
and just looked down. William and his friend moved closer to James and
William repeated his question. James said: “Hey listen …it sounds like you
had too much to drink…you don’t handle your liquor too well. Let it go.”
William and his friend looked at each other and started laughing. William’s
friend took a step towards James and said: “What if we won’t let it go?”
When he took another step towards James, James moved forward, shoved him
with both hands, and said: “Get out of my face.” Without hesitating, William
then stepped forward and tried to shove James in the chest, but missed and hit
him in the face. James fell back slightly. He then turned around, took a couple
steps away from William, and appeared to reach for something in his pocket.
William quickly pursued James from behind and punched him in the side of the
head. James fell to the ground. William’s friend stepped forward and kicked
James. William and his friend then walked away quickly and quietly.
After completing the distraction tasks, participants were asked to read and
respond to sixteen recall questions about each of the stories. Participants were
instructed to circle “yes” next to facts that were accurately reported from the
story. If a fact did not accurately describe a fact from the story, or if the fact
was not in the story at all, participants were instructed to circle “no”.195
The yes/no questions were designed with testable purposes in mind. For
the fight scenario, the sixteen questions presented were composed of six actor
aggression questions, six mitigating circumstances questions, and four neutral
questions. Aggressiveness questions described an aggressive action, such as:
“William punched James from behind,” or “After James fell to the ground,
William kicked him.” Mitigating behavior questions described facts that would
potentially justify the actor’s action or lessen his legal or moral responsibility.
Mitigating statements included: “After being punched, James took out an
object from his pocket,” or “When William hit James in the face, he was really
trying to push him rather than punch him.” Aggressiveness and mitigating
195

These dependent variable measures are reproduced in their entirety in Appendix A.
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behavior question indexes were split into two smaller indexes: one for accurate
statements (to test for recall errors) and one for inaccurate statements (to test
for false memories).
For the employment termination scenario, six questions were designed as
actor favorable questions (facts relating to good job performance), six were
designed as actor unfavorable questions (facts relating to bad job performance),
and four were designed as actor neutral questions. Half of the questions
accurately described facts from the story (thereby testing recall accuracy) and
half did not (thereby testing false memories).
Because of the design of the questions, participant responses could be
analyzed to determine not simply the accuracy of people’s memories, but also
whether errors in memory could systematically demonstrate that unconscious
racial bias manifests in legal decision-making processes. For example, if
participants who read about an African American employee more frequently
falsely recalled that she had received mixed reviews from superiors, while
participants who read about a Caucasian employee more frequently (correctly)
recalled that she had received positive reviews, it would indicate that the race
of the employee affected participants’ memories in racially biased ways.
The primary independent variable was the race of the protagonist of the
story.196 For the employment story, participants read either about Brenda, a
Caucasian woman, Keisha, an African American woman, or Ka’olu, a
Hawaiian woman. For the fight story, participants read about either William, a
Caucasian man, Tyronne, an African-American man, or Kawika, a Hawaiian
man. Participants were randomly assigned to a race category.197 Other than
the names and races of the actors, the stories were identical.
To date, most empirical studies on race and law typically have used a
Black-White study paradigm.198 While this paradigm reflects both historical
and present-day discrimination, it is an incomplete attempt to understand the
complex nature of culture and discrimination. The increasing diversity within
196

Legal culture/Non-Legal Culture was another independent variable. Results for that
variable, however, were not systematic and are not discussed in this Article. Future
projects will continue to examine the effects of this variable. For a discussion of legal
culture and its effects, see Levinson, supra note __.
197
Participants read about actors of the same race in both stories. For example,
participants who read about Tyronne also read about Keisha. This was done in order to
reduce the chances that participants would recognize what was being tested.
198
See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note __ (reviewing a variety of mock jury
studies). But see, e.g., Harmon M. Hosch et al., A Comparison of Anglo-American and
Mexican-American Jurors’ Judgments of Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children
From Abuse, 21 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1681 (1991).
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the United States199 requires attention to a broader scope of racial and cultural
diversity in empirical legal studies.200 In addition to testing the traditional
Black-White paradigm, the current study investigated how unconscious
discrimination may manifest in memory processes relating to Hawaiians.
Although the population of Hawaiians is not large outside of the state of
Hawai'i, the recent history of the Hawaiian people is complex, meaningful, and
can demonstrate the power of stereotypes in the legal context.201 By
conducting the empirical study in Hawai'i, the study could achieve three goals
that would be difficult elsewhere: (1) the linkages between Hawaiians and
implicit memory bias could be investigated in a culturally and legally relevant
context; (2) African American bias and stereotypes could be examined in a
community with a historically small African American population202 (finding
implicit biases against African Americans in Hawai'i would tend to illustrate
the power of unconscious racism and its propagation through external sources
such as media); and (3) biases and stereotypes could be tested among a diverse
population, which would indicate that implicit biases are manifested in the
legal setting by a broader (not just Caucasian) juror population.203
199

See U.S. Census Bureau, US Interim Projections by Age Sex Race, and Hispanic
Origin, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/ (last visited Aug. 2006) (displaying
population projections until 2050, based on numbers in 2000 census).
200
Studies outside of the law, particularly using the IAT, have incorporated a wide
range of studies testing implicit biases that spans well beyond the Black-White paradigm.
(last visited Aug. 2006) (offering IATs testing implicit
https://implicit.harvard.edu
attitudes regarding Arabs and Muslims, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, among
others).
201
For more on the challenges faced by the Hawaiian community in the legal system,
see, e.g. NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed.,
1991); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 95, 102 & n. 41 (1998); Chris K. Iijima, Race over Rice: Binary Analytical
Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice
v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 91 (2000). Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances:
Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995);
Le'a Malia Kanehe, Recent Development, The Akaka Bill: The Native Hawaiians' Race for
Federal Recognition, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 857 (2001); Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred
Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the
Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV.
463 (1995); Noelle M. Kahanu & Jon M. Van Dyke, Native Hawaiian Entitlement to
Sovereignty: An Overview, 17 U. HAW L. REV. 427 (1995).
202
There is, however, a meaningful history of African Americans in Hawaii. See
THEY FOLLOWED THE TRADE WINDS: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN HAWAII (Miles Jackson ed.,
2004).
203
Many studies on race and juries have tested biases only among groups of Caucasian
participants. Based on the implicit theories I have described, a diverse group of
participants might be just as susceptible to memory biases. Due to its diverse population
and university community, Hawai'i provides a natural place for such investigations. In the
study I conducted, only 28 participants were Caucasian. This statistic would tend to
indicate that results favoring Caucasians would not simply be driven by an in-group bias.203
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After completing the recognition task, participants responded to the SDO
scale.204 By testing participants on both the memory study and the SDO, I
could examine the relationship, if any, between implicit memory bias and
explicit racial preferences. The SDO scale used in this study was the 14-item
SDO introduced by Pratto and her colleagues. It included the following
measures, among others:205
1) Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others.
2) This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all
people were.
3) It is important that we treat other countries as equals.
4) If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in
this country.
Participants were instructed to respond whether they had a positive or
negative feeling about the items. For each item, they assigned a score. A score
of “1” indicated very negative and a score of “7” indicated very positive.206
B. Results: Failed Memories and Racial Minorities
Participants misremembered certain legally relevant facts in a racially
biased manner. The most telling results emerged from participant memories of
The Confrontation. Systematic errors in recall affected participants’ memories
of The Confrontation in a manner harmful to African Americans, and to a
lesser extent, Hawaiians.

See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note __ (pointing out that many studies of the influence
of race on jury decision-making has only used Caucasian participants); Mitchell et al.,
supra, note __ (making a similar observation in the context of mock jury studies on racial
bias). Instead, it indicates that (pro-Caucasian or anti African-American) unconscious
racial biases can be harbored across a variety of races.
204
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
205
Here are the rest of the measures: 1) All humans should be treated equally. 2)
Increased social equality. 3) Some people are just more worthy than others. 4) To get ahead
in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others. 5) In an ideal world, all nations would
be equal. 6) Some people are just more deserving than others. 7) Equality. 8) It is not a
problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others. 9) Some people are just
inferior to others. 10) Increased economic equality.
206
Each number has its own label. A score of “2” means “negative.” A score of 3
means “slightly negative.” A score of 4 means “neither positive or negative.” A score of 5
means “slightly positive.” A score of 6 means “positive.” In order to convert the responses
into a total score, half of the measures were reverse coded (e.g. scores of 7 are converted to
scores of 1) and the responses were totaled.
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1. Remembering and Misremembering Aggression in The Confrontation.
Participants had an easier time successfully recalling aggressive facts when
the actor was African American compared to when the actor was Caucasian.207
For example, participants who read about Tyronne had a recall accuracy rate of
80.7%. That is, they failed to recall just 19.3% of facts relating to aggressive
actions. Participants who read about Kawika failed to recall 29.0% of these
facts, and participants who read about William failed to recall 31.5% of these
facts. Thus, participants were more likely to remember Tyronne’s aggressive
behavior than William’s aggressive behavior, even when the facts were quite
simple and only 15 minutes or so had elapsed since reading the facts. See the
Graph below. Two instances detailing results of aggressive fact recall also help
illustrate this finding208:

Recall Errors on Aggression Facts (%)

% Memory Errors

30

20

10

0
William

Tyronne

Actor

Example 1 (Aggression- Failed Recall): “When they saw him outside a

207

This result, indicated by a MANOVA, was significant, F (1, 145) = 4.16, p<.05.
Chi-square analyses were performed on individual instances of fact recall. These
tests compared two measures: (1) a race measure- comparing the three racial conditions
against each other in one test, and (2) a major-minority measure- comparing the Caucasian
condition to a combined group of the Hawaiian and African American conditions.
208
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diner, William and his friend approached James.”209
This fact, which would tend to indicate that the fight was initiated by
William, accurately reflected information from the story. Participants who
read about Tyronne or Kawika were significantly more likely to correctly recall
this information than participants who read about William.210 While a
resounding 92% of participants who read about Tyronne or Kawika correctly
recalled this aggressive action (just an 8% error rate), only 77% who read about
William recalled it (a 23% error rate).211
Example 2 (Aggression- Failed Recall): “Tyronne punched James from
behind.”212
This fact also accurately reflected information from the story. Participants
who read about Tyronne were more likely to correctly recall this fact compared
to participants who read about William or Kawika. Error rates near 50%
indicate that participants in all groups had a difficult time remembering this
fact. Yet the error rates nonetheless point towards a race memory bias. 65%
and 57% of the participants who read about Kawika and William, respectively
failed to recall this aggressive fact, while just 41% who read about Tyronne
failed to recall it.213
Responses on the index of combined false memory questions did not
generate a main effect. However, a significant false memory effect did emerge
on one of the three false memory measures. This example indicates that false
memories can manifest in the legal setting in biased ways:
Example 3 (Aggression- False Memory): “After James said ‘Let it go,’
Tyronne replied by saying ‘What if we won’t let it go?’”214
This statement inaccurately depicts information from the story and
demonstrates the potential connection between false memories, source
attribution errors, and implicit memory bias.215 Participants reading about
Tyronne or Kawika were more likely to exhibit false memories for this fact

209

Fight DV #14
This finding was statistically significant, p<.05
211
Appendix A presents a chart of the results for all of the individual Examples
presented in the Section.
212
Fight DV #10.
213
This finding was marginally significant, p= .055.
214
Fight DV #5.
215
Recall from The Confrontation that it was the actor’s friend, not the actor himself,
who made that aggressive statement.
210
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than participants reading about William.216 In fact, 70% of participants who
read about Tyronne or Kawika mistakenly believed that the statement was
accurate. For participants reading about William, 56% believed it was
accurate. Thus, although the majority of participants mis-remembered this fact,
participants reading about an African American or Hawaiian were significantly
more likely to misremember it in a manner that harmed the defendant.
2. Remembering
Confrontation

and

Misremembering

Mitigating

Factors

in

The

With respect to recall accuracy of mitigation questions, no significant index
differences emerged based on race. However, for false memories of mitigating
circumstances, an unexpected result emerged. Participants who read about
Kawika were more likely to exhibit false memories of mitigating facts
compared to participants reading about William or Tyronne.217 Participants
who read about Kawika exhibited false memories for 50% of the inaccurate
mitigating facts. These facts, if true, would have tended to lessen Kawika’s
legal or moral responsibility for the incident. Participants who read about
William and Tyronne exhibited false memories for fewer facts, 38% and 37%
of these questions, respectively. These results indicate that the nature of
unconscious biases in memory recall are complex and can be multidirectional
(they can simultaneously penalize and mitigate). In recalling aggressive
actions, participants’ memories sometimes worked to penalize Kawika. But in
recalling mitigating facts, participants’ memories sometimes worked to help
Kawika. An instance of a mitigating false memory question helps demonstrate:
Example 4 (Mitigating- False Memory): James shoved Kawika.218
This mitigating statement inaccurately reflected the story and thus, if
allegedly recalled by participants, would constitute a false memory. In the
story, James shoved Kawika’s friend, not Kawika.219 If James had in fact
shoved Kawika, it would tend to mitigate later aggressive actions taken by
Kawika. Significant results emerged for this statement when comparing
responses of participants reading about Kawika to those reading about William
and Tyronne. A compelling 75% of participants who read about Kawika
216

A chi-square indicated that this result was significant, p<.05 in comparing a
combined measure of African American and Hawaiian condition participants with
Caucasian condition participants. It was also marginally significant when comparing
African Americans condition participants directly to Caucasian condition participants, p=
.062.
217
An ANOVA on the false memory mitigation index revealed significant effects, F
(2, 149) = 3.05, p=.05.
218
Fight DV #16.
219
A false memory in this case would thus involve a source attribution error.
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exhibited this false memory while those who read about Caucasians and
African Americans exhibited 57% and 53% false memories, respectively.220
It is too early to confidently interpret this result. However, a possibility
worth exploring relates to the complex and unique relationship between
localism in the community221 (among Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian people
alike) and positive and negative stereotypes. Such a unique dynamic could
simultaneously implicate negative stereotypes of aggression and more positive
stereotypes regarding mitigation (understanding the historical and societal role
and prevalence of the provocation of Hawaiians, for example).222 As a result,
the false memory result above could be explained if the provocation of
Hawaiians was a societal stereotype—since stereotypes are linked to false
memory generation. Future studies should investigate this unique source of
false memory and the possibility of multidirectional stereotype activation in
memory biases.
3. Instances of Failed Recall in Employment Story
Participants misremembered many more facts from the fight scenario than
the employment scenario.223 Overall, participants exhibited a 71.2% recall
accuracy rate for the fight scenario (with participants exhibiting a 34% false
alarm rate) and a 94.0% recall accuracy rate for the employment scenario (with
a 15.2% false alarm rate). While the stories read by participants were not
exceedingly simple, they were significantly simpler than the stories typically
heard by jurors, and somewhat simpler than other memory studies on juries or
mock-juries.224 The results indicate that the employment scenario was perhaps
too easy for participants to recall. Yet, it is unclear why The Confrontation,
also a simple story, generated significant errors while the employment story did
not. Despite the few significant results that were obtained in this study, the
employment discrimination arena should not be discounted when discussing
memory errors. Future tests should examine the employment domain in more
realistic (and also perhaps more stereotype-consistent) situations. Researchers
might also consider varying gender in addition to race, as gender has been
shown to trigger stereotype consistent false memories in the employment
220

A chi-square indicated that results were significant for Hawaiians compared to
Caucasians, p<.05, and Hawaiians compared to African Americans, p<.05.
221
Eric K. Yamamoto, The Significance of Local, in SOCIAL PROCESSES IN HAWAII
(Peter Manicus, ed. 1974).
222
The existence of positive and negative stereotypes about a race should not be
surprising and has been documented.
223
These results are not due to order effects. To eliminate order effects, participants
were presented the scenarios in both orders.
224
Compare the case fact data presented in the memory study conducted by Pritchard
& Keenan, supra note __. In that study, participants viewed a thirty-five minute video of
court testimony and were quizzed for recall. The test in this study was substantially easier.
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context.225
Within the employment story, though the indexes did not reveal significant
effects, there was one interesting and significant false memory that emerged:
Example 5 (Competence- False Memory): “Brenda was named Employee
of the Month.”226
This statement was inaccurate. Participants who had false memories of this
statement erroneously believed that Brenda achieved this honor. In the story, it
was Brenda’s father, not Brenda who earned this award. Once again, errors of
this type can be attributed to source misattribution. The results indicated that
participants who read about Brenda, compared to those who read about Keisha
and Ka’olu, were more likely to falsely remember this fact.227 Participants who
read about Brenda falsely remembered it 17% of the time while participants
who read about Keisha and Ka’olu remembered it 10% and 2%, respectively.
4. Implicit Memory Bias and Explicit Racism
I next measured whether there was a relationship between explicit racial
preferences (as measured by the SDO scale) and implicit memory recall. For
memory recall indexes (such as the aggression recall index for The
Confrontation) and for most individual memory recall measures, there was no
significant relationship between memory recall and explicit racial preferences.
This finding indicates that participants who manifested more implicit memory
bias were not more likely to be explicitly biased. A few individual instances of
memory recall in the African American and Hawaiian race conditions,
however, did indicate a relationship (both correlative and predictive) in the
opposite direction. That is, in a few instances people with lower SDO scores
(indicating less explicit racism) were surprisingly more likely to demonstrate
more racially biased recall than people with higher SDO scores.
I tested the correlation between the memory measures (both indexes and
individual questions) and total SDO scores for participants in each race
condition, and followed these correlations up with linear regression analyses.
For the memory index responses and most memory questions, no significant
results emerged. For a few individual memory measures, however, significant
correlations and predictive relationships emerged. The following examples
illustrate this unexpected effect.
225

See Lenton, supra note __; Macrae, supra note __.
Employment DV #2.
227
A chi-square revealed that this effect was significant, measuring all three race
conditions against each other, p<.05.
226
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Significant correlations emerged in the African American race condition
for SDO scores and the following memory measures: (1) After James fell to the
ground, Tyronne kicked him; and (2) When Tyronne hit James in the face, he
was really trying to push him rather than punch him. The first memory
measure above was negatively correlated to SDO score and the second was
positively correlated to SDO score.228 These correlations indicated that
participants who explicitly favored racial equality were (1) more likely to have
false memories that Tyronne kicked James and (2) less likely to accurately
recall that Tyronne was trying to push James rather than punch him. Linear
regression analyses were also significant for these measures, indicating that
SDO scores served as predictors for these two memory measures in the same
surprising direction. These two examples provide counterintuitive results,
indicating that people who explicitly favor more social equality sometimes
were more likely to recall facts in biased ways than those who explicitly
favored less social equality.229
In the Hawaiian condition, a significant correlation emerged between
memory recall and SDO score for the memory measure Ka’olu used her phone
to make long distance calls. This memory measure was significantly correlated
with overall SDO score in the negative direction.230 This correlation means
that the more likely participants were to favor equality (generating a lower
SDO score), the more likely they were to accurately remember this fact about
Ka’olu. A linear regression analysis was also significant for this memory
measure, indicating that SDO score served as a negative predictor of this
accurate memory recall response.231
Taken together, the correlation and regression results indicate that explicit
racial preferences and implicit recall bias usually were not significantly related.
However, in the African American and Hawaiian conditions, there were
individual instances where lower explicit bias actually predicted greater
memory bias. In the Caucasian condition, there was one instance where higher
explicit bias predicted greater memory bias.232
228

Two-tailed Pearson correlations were significant for both of these memory
measures, p<.05.
229
It should be noted that the relationship between SDO scores and implicit measures
are relative. That is, people who favor “less social equality” did not necessary disapprove
of social equality and were not necessarily explicitly racist. Instead, relative to other
participants in the study, those who favored less equality were more likely to respond to
certain questions in the manner reported.
230
A two-tailed Pearson correlation was significant for this measure, p<.05.
231
The linear regression analysis was significant, p<.05. A regression also indicated
that a neutral memory question (“Ka’olu worked as a marketing clerk”) was also predicted
by SDO by regression in the negative direction, t= -2.39, p<.05.
232
In the Caucasian condition, a two-tiered Pearson correlation coefficient was
significant (in the positive direction) between memory recall and SDO score for the
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5. Limitations of the Study
The results of the study complement existing discourse on implicit biases
and memory errors and provide support for the theory that implicit racial bias
affects case fact memories within the legal process. Nonetheless, this study
should only begin the empirical examination of implicit racial biases in case
fact memories. The methodology used in the study imperfectly and only
loosely matched true legal processes. For example, the study used stories that
resembled some aspects of real life cases, but did not use real cases. The study
also tested university study participants, not real jurors (or judges). Rather than
participating in a trial, participants simply filled out a multi-part survey. For
these reasons and others,233 this empirical study alone should not be considered
conclusive proof that the results generalize to the legal setting.234 However,
taken in the context of existing research on implicit biases and memory errors,
the study offers significant support for the claim and should generate real life
concerns about racial justice in legal processes.
V. IMPLICIT BIASES, CULTURAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DEBIASING

measure William and his friend hit James one time each. This measure indicates opposite
results than those in the African American and Hawaiian conditions. The more likely
participants were to explicitly favor racial and social hierarchy (generating a higher SDO
score) the more likely they were to have false memories of this (mitigating) fact favoring
William (recall from the story that William actually hit James twice). A linear regression
analysis was also significant for this memory measure, indicating that SDO score served as
a predictor of this false memory response. The linear regression analysis was significant,
t=3.11, p<.05. Thus, unlike the instances in the African American and Hawaiian
conditions indicating lower explicit racial preferences sometimes served as a predictor of
implicit memory bias, this instance indicated that higher explicit racial preference predicted
implicit memory bias.
233
Another example of the disconnect between the study and real legal processes is the
ease and simplicity of the stories that were tested. A real case would involve vastly greater
amounts of information. The judicial process thus requires a much more significant
cognitive effort by jurors to encode and recall information. Recall, however, that studies
on cognitive depletion indicate that the greater the attention depletion, the greater the
likelihood of stereotype consistent false memories. This memory limitation raises the issue
of whether memory biases in real cases might be worse than the empirical study illustrates.
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
234
Most studies fail in one way or another to replicate the legal setting. One
particularly impressive effort to replicate is that of Samuel Sommers. Samuel R. Sommers,
On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Informational and Motivational Effects
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597
(2006). Sommers gained access to Washtenaw county (Michigan) courts, where jurors
were given an option to participate in his study or a real case. See infra note __ and
accompanying text for a discussion of this study and its implications.
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The results of the empirical study, combined with existing research on
implicit biases and memory, lead to the conclusion that implicit memory biases
almost certainly operate in legal decision-making. In light of previous legal
discourse on cognitive errors, one might expect the discussion now to turn
towards a science-driven “debiasing” proposal. A debiasing methodology
approaches implicit memory bias as an undesirable cognitive error that can
perhaps be reversed through scientific experimentation. Before proceeding
with such an analysis, however, pause is necessitated by the fact that the cause
of implicit memory bias is not a scientific error or quirk but instead is a
manifestation of social and cultural factors that generate ingrained and
automatic racial preferences.
The challenge of addressing unconscious memory bias in legal decisionmaking is twofold. First, it requires gaining a deeper understanding of implicit
racial bias by examining the relationship between cultural forces and cognitive
processes.235 This examination shows that permanent elimination of implicit
memory bias can only occur through a sustained process of cultural acceptance
and change. Second, it requires embracing scientific methods to search for
ways to temporarily moderate or eliminate the detrimental effects of implicit
racism.236 Though science will not be able to solve the problem of implicit
racial bias without cultural change, it has already helped identify the causal
factors behind implicit biases as well as provided substantial clues about
temporary reduction strategies.237 The need for continued scientific exploration
is similarly heightened by a paradoxical legal context: the legal system
simultaneously embraces a mission of social justice while employing an
implicitly biased decision-making process that hinders justice from being done.
A multi-faceted response combining cultural change and scientific achievement
is thus needed.
A. Cognitive Biases, Cultural Responsibility, and Social Justice
Who or what is responsible for implicit racial biases? Surprisingly few of
the legal projects on implicit racial bias examine the causes of the biases or
discuss the probable link between historical and cultural discrimination and
235

The connection between culture and cognitive biases similarly has been overlooked
in behavioral law and economics scholarship. See Levinson & Peng, supra note __.
236
Kang and Banaji, for example, demonstrated why cultural change and science are
not mutually exclusive. They suggested that using “debiasing agents” might over time help
reduce stereotypes by changing the way people think about social categories. See supra
note __ and accompanying text. This link between cultural change and science exemplifies
the potential power of embracing the “fair measures” model Kang and Banaji suggest.
237
Because cultural change will happen slowly (and may not happen at all without a
sustained effort), the scientific endeavor will continue to be at the forefront of implicit bias
discourse.
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implicit racial biases. Instead, many simply address the compelling evidence
of implicit bias by employing a “debiasing” framework. This style of problem
reduction approach is a critical component of implicit bias discussions, but
should not be both the beginning and end of discourse. Furthermore, the
difficulty that has been encountered in eliminating implicit racial biases should
serve as a reminder that these automatic and unconscious biases are not random
and meaningless “noise,” but powerful and meaningful connections between
our life experiences, society and cognitive processes.
Although legal scholars have frequently overlooked the social and cultural
links to implicit biases, psychologists often discuss the causes of implicit biases
and stereotypes. According to Laurie Rudman, implicit biases are caused by a
variety of factors, including culture.238 “System Justification Theory,” for
example, posits that people sometimes act implicitly and automatically to
maintain a structure of social order.239 This implicit need for social order,
which often conflicts with a person’s explicit preferences, could be one direct
link between a culture of racial subordination and implicit racial bias. In a
study investigating System Justification Theory, Rudman and her colleagues
tested the link between cultural preferences and implicit (versus explicit) group
favoritism.240 They found that members of less favored minority groups (such
as overweight people and elderly people) implicitly preferred more favored
minority groups (such as Asians and Jews) to their own groups, but that these
preferences did not operate explicitly.241 The results indicated that the lower
the cultural status of the group, the more likely that members of that group
would demonstrate “automatic ingroup devaluation.”242 This research suggests
that although people may act or speak out to (explicitly) reject social ordering
of preferred groups, they are implicitly motivated to maintain social and
cultural hierarchies. In the legal setting, System Justification Theory explains
how an implicit memory bias might act to similarly and unconsciously
subordinate minorities. As the empirical study in Section IV demonstrated, a
diverse participant population implicitly disfavored African Americans even

238

Rudman, supra note __ at 136 (identifying experiences, affect, cognitive balance,
and the self as other potential causal links).
239
See John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 6 POL. PSYCHOL.
881 (2004). System Justification Theory evidence shows, for example, that many members
of minority groups harbor negative stereotypes about their own groups. For a new
discussion of system justification theory in law and social justice, see Gary Blasi & John T.
Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Legal Advocacy and
Social Justice (forthcoming CAL. L. REV. 2006).
240
Laurie A. Rudman et al., Minority Members' Implicit Attitudes: Automatic Ingroup
Bias As A Function Of Group Status, 20 SOC. COGNITION 294 (2002).
241
Id.
242
Id. at __.
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though they frequently explicitly favored equality.243
The connection between implicit biases and culture is not surprising. After
all, it is quite intuitive that our biases reflect societal stereotypes. Research on
stereotype formation and maintenance confirms that stereotypes, a key
ingredient in implicit memory bias, are instilled at an early age and come from
cultural and societal beliefs.244 According to Antony Page, psychologists have
found that stereotypes arise when a person is as young as three years old and
are usually learned from parents, peers, and the media.245 As people grow
older, their stereotypes become unconscious and remain mostly unchanged
even as they develop non-prejudiced explicit views.246 Howard Ehrlich stated,
“stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of social heritage of
society…[n]o person can grow up in a society without having learned the
stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups.”247 This research illustrates
the cultural grip that negative stereotypes have on our society and underscores
the importance both of a process of cultural change and early interventional
approaches to change harmful stereotypes.
Recognizing the need to act against implicit bias on a societal as well as
scientific level, Rudman presented several suggestions for change that are
grounded both in theory and in practice.248 These suggestions include elements
of education, policy advocacy, intergroup contact, and social inclusiveness.
Legal scholars should take note that these solutions are neither entirely
empirical nor are they primarily debiasing-focused. Instead, they are diverse in
methodologies and reflect a broader understanding of implicit biases as a
societal problem. Specifically, Rudman called for: informing people about
implicit biases, followed by “efforts to retain and expand policies that serve to
override them, including affirmation action;”249 providing people the
243

See supra Section IV.
Recall that stereotype-consistency is a major theme in false memory generation.
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
245
Id. at 203, citing Frances E. Aboud & Maria Amato, Developmental and
Socialization Influences on Intergroup Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: INTERGROUP PROCESSES 65, 73-76 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner
eds., 2001).
246
Id. at 204, (citing Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107
PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 103-04 (2000).
247
Page, supra note __ at 203, quoting HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973).
248
Rudman, supra note __ at 138.
249
Id. at 138 (pointing out the overly optimistic nature of Affirmative Action’s 25 year
“shelf life” under Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). These suggestions are
supported in part by Kang and Banaji’s “fair measures” proposal, which uses a variety of
evidence on implicit bias to propose a multi-faceted framework for progress. See Kang &
Banaji, supra note __.
244
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opportunity to be more emotionally comfortable with out group members250;
and recognizing the cultural influences on the self while striving for a more
inclusive society. These proposed solutions provide legally relevant pathways
that can be implemented to eventually reduce the harmful effects of implicit
memory bias. In fact, scholars have already begun embracing each of these
suggestions. Kang and Banaji have argued that “fair measures” must be taken
specifically to combat the societal harms of implicit biases.251 Scholars of
intergroup contact have confirmed that sharing experiences with outgroup
members truly works to reduce biases.252 And legal commentators beginning
with Charles Lawrence have recognized the importance of recognizing
culture’s influences on the self within a broader legal and societal context.253
We must now coordinate these efforts for change.
Ignoring cultural responsibility for implicit racial biases is not simply a
failure to connect the root of the bias to the bias itself or a failure to develop an
accurate model of legal decision-making. Instead, ignoring the cultural
foundations of implicit bias risks minimizing the responsibility of the legal
system to deal with a society that continues to exhibit systematically racial
preferences. A debiasing framework, acting alone and without cultural context,
thus risks ignoring the social justice mission of the law.254 When Charles
Lawrence first wrote about unconscious racism, he was not simply telling us
that people act in biased ways but they do not always realize it. He was telling
us that people are racist and that our culture is responsible.255 Thus, as we
digest yet again the newest piece of evidence that implicit bias manifests in the
legal system, we must understand that the deviation from rational decisionmaking is not simply a cognitive glitch, but a meaningful cultural statement
that reflects the way we unknowingly carry our society’s weaknesses with us at
all times, even when encoding and recalling the simplest of facts. Dealing with
implicit racial biases, then, requires more than a scientific effort at debiasing
through cues, primes, or deception. It requires a recognition that their very
existence represents a reflection of the past and current state of American
250

text.

251

See the discussion of intergroup contact theory, infra note __ and accompanying

See Kang & Banaji, supra note __.
See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda L. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006).
253
See Lawrence, supra note __.
254
More detailed discussions of racial history, the American culture of discrimination,
and its links to equal protection admittedly occur outside the mostly scientific scope of this
paper. Nonetheless, each of these components must be discussed in the context of
unconscious racism. See generally, Lawrence, supra note __. See also Yamamoto, supra
note __ (focusing on cultural responsibility in race relations). “Debiasing,” by its nature is
not always culturally ignorant. Kang and Banaji’s model, for example, uses debiasing
concepts in order to effectuate slow cultural change. See Kang and Banaji, supra note __.
255
Id. at __.
252
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culture. And this recognition, in turn, calls for steps that will facilitate cultural
change.
B. Temporary Debiasing of Stereotypes and Memory Errors
Although they do not always embrace the connection between cultural
responsibility, social justice and implicit cognitions, debiasing efforts have
significant practical potential for their ability to reduce or temporarily eliminate
implicit memory biases.256 A debiasing approach to the problem of implicit
memory bias can involve two interrelated tactics— reducing the power,
frequency or pervasiveness of implicit racial biases and improving overall
memory accuracy. Both types of temporary measures give us clues as to how
taking specific procedural actions within the legal system can reduce the
harmful effects of implicit memory bias.
1. Temporarily Reducing Implicit Biases.
A significant amount of recent research has focused on whether implicit
stereotypes can be temporarily eliminated or moderated.257 These efforts have
achieved mixed levels of success, and indicate that exposure to diversity or
viewing minority exemplars, for example, can sometimes temporarily reduce
people’s implicit biases.258 None of this research has directly tested how
implicit memory bias might be reduced, nor has it been applied to jury
decision-making.259 Nevertheless, studies indicate that confronting jurors with
their implicit biases, striving for more diverse juries, and facilitating a more
counter-stereotypic academy of lawyers and judges could help reduce the
occurrence of implicit memory bias. It must be noted, however, that before
any concrete suggestions should be implemented, more research must be
conducted to confirm their benefits in legal decision-making.
More Counter-Stereotypic Attorneys and Judges. Some studies indicate
that exposing jurors to minority exemplars such as attorneys and judges might
help reduce implicit memory bias. A study by Dasgupta and Greenwald found
that exposure to admired minority exemplars can decrease implicit
preferences.260 In that study, after taking a Black-White IAT, participants were
exposed to pictures of “famous and admired” African Americans, such as Colin
Powell, Will Smith, and Eddie Murphy, and “infamous and disliked”
256

There are also theoretical implications. Debiasing studies may offer clues as to
why the pervasive effects of implicit biases continue to prosper in our automatic and
unconscious cognitive processes.
257
Some of these studies have been reviewed in other contexts. See, e.g., Kang, supra
note __, Page, supra note __; Kang & Banaji, supra note __.
258
Page, supra note __ at 237, citing Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note __.
259
But see Sommers, infra note __ and accompanying text.
260
Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note __.
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Caucasian Americans, such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Howard Stern, and John
Gotti.261 After exposure to these pictures (which were presented under the
guise of being a test of famous person recognition), participants immediately
retook an IAT, and took yet another IAT after twenty-four hours. Results
indicated that the exposure to the African American exemplars and disliked
Caucasians reduced (but did not eliminate) automatic pro-White implicit bias,
and that bias reduction continued for at least twenty-four hours.262
A more recent study by Nilanjana Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari harnessed
this knowledge to test how exemplary leaders can affect women’s automatic
biases about their own in-group.263 The study indicated that exposure to
women in leadership positions can lead to a reduction of in-group implicit
biases among women.264 One important contribution of Dasgupta and Asgari’s
study was that it examined the role of exemplars in naturally occurring
leadership roles (such as college students’ exposure to female professors).
Their results indicate that women who “inhabit local environments in which
women frequently occupy counter-stereotypic leadership roles” can undermine
automatic stereotypes.265 Results such as these, which illustrate the debiasing
potential of exemplars, prompted Kang and Banaji to argue for “fair measures”
in hiring more counter-stereotypical employees.266 Implementing a fair
measures paradigm in the legal profession (which would include a systematic
effort to increase counter-stereotypic law students, lawyers and judges) could
261

Id. at 811.
Id. at __. These results were reported in contrast to participants in a control
condition (who saw no images) and in a pro-White exemplar condition. The researchers
also found similar effects in reducing implicit bias related to elderly. Interestingly, though
a reduction in implicit attitudes was found, explicit racial preferences were not significantly
altered.
263
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure To
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders And Its Effect On The Malleability of Automatic
Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642 (2004).
264
Id. at 654. Other studies have investigated gender stereotype reduction using mental
imagery. Unlike real-life exposure to counter-stereotypic (human) exemplars as
investigated by Dasgupta and Asgari, Irene Blair and her colleagues tested how simply
imagining and then describing a “strong woman” (for example) might reduce implicit bias
as measured on the IAT. Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The
Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 828 (2001). Their results were significant, indicating that mentally accessing a
counter-stereotype can help reduce implicit bias. Recent research also indicates that
appealing to a person’s egalitarian beliefs can help moderate discriminatory behavior.
Nalanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to Behavior:
The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268 (2006)(testing the relationship between egalitarian
beliefs and anti-gay behaviors).
265
Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note __.
266
Kang & Banaji, supra note __ at __.
262
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similarly and eventually generate debiasing benefits in jury decision-making.267
Confronting Jurors with Biases. New research indicates that explicitly
confronting people with their biases may be an effective tool in decreasing
stereotyped responses. A study by Alexander Czopp and his colleagues found
that even though confrontations can create hostility towards a confronter, they
can (at least temporarily) also reduce stereotypes.268 In the study, participants
were asked to participate in an on-line chat.269 During this chat, participants
were asked to give their impressions about pictures and statements. These
pictures and statements were designed deliberately so that they would invoke at
least some racial stereotypes, thus assuring that participant responses would be
racially stereotype-consistent enough to allow for confrontation.270 After the
participants gave such stereotype-consistent responses, a collaborator (who was
posing as another participant in the on-line chat) confronted them about their
potentially racist responses.271 Post-confrontation, participants were given a
confidential stereotype test (in which participants were alone-- no collaborator
was present to confront them). The researchers found that post-confrontation
participant responses displayed significantly fewer stereotypes (compared to
before being confronted). One potential practical implication of this line of
research involves using racial stereotype measures on pre-trial jury
questionnaires, and non-threateningly confronting jurors with their biases
during voir dire or jury instructions.272
More Diverse Juries. Culture and diversity have been linked to the
reduction of implicit biases. These studies indicate that racially diverse juries,
for example, may make fewer cognitive errors than homogeneous jurors, and
that learning about or experiencing diversity and multicultural ideologies in
general can reduce implicit bias. In a study of legal decision-making

267

It is hard to predict, however, how positive effects of an African-American attorney
or judge, for example, would interact with the negative effects of a stereotype-consistent
African American criminal defendant.
268
Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing Up for a Change: Reducing Bias Through
Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784 (2006).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id. at __. For example, one resembled the following: “but maybe it would be good
to think about Blacks in other ways that are a little more fair? it just seems that a lot of
times Blacks don't get equal treatment in our society. you know what i mean?” The
confrontations were successful using low level threats (such as the one quoted) and high
level threats (which involved mentioning that the participant’s responses sounded racist).
272
Debiasing judges through confrontations would require other measures. It is
important to note that there are no indicators yet that such a juror confrontation would
reduce implicit bias in the legal setting. Before implementing any juror confrontation
scheme, the specific design should be tested empirically.
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processes, Samuel Sommers recorded and evaluated mock jury deliberations.273
Some mock-juries included only Caucasians and others included both
Caucasians and African-Americans.274
Sommers found that racially
heterogeneous mock juries cited more facts from the case, made fewer errors
when discussing facts (and when they did make errors, were more likely to
correct them275), and were more open to discussing racism than homogonous
Caucasian juries.276 Although Sommers did not test implicit bias reduction, the
results hold promise that diverse juries might better overcome implicit memory
biases than homogenous juries. In practice, however, calling for more diverse
juries is controversial. Courts are hesitant to apply diversity rationales to petit
juries, and will generally look only at juror representation across a larger
community.277 However, if other measures are less effective in overcoming
implicit memory bias, then striving for (or even requiring) heterogeneous juries
might be warranted, particularly when legal participants come from stereotyped
groups.
Juror Diversity Training. Implementing diversity or multiculturalism
training for jurors might similarly help reduce implicating memory biases. A
study by Jennifer Richeson and Richard Nussbaum found that exposing
participants to a multicultural viewpoint, compared to a “color-blind”
viewpoint, resulted in lesser implicit bias on the Black-White IAT.278 In that
study, participants learned about either the virtues of multiculturalism
(celebrating differences across groups) or color-blindness (ignoring differences
across groups).279 This simple introduction to the two ideologies was enough
to affect IAT outcome.280 Those who learned about multiculturalism reduced
their implicit biases and displayed significantly less implicit bias than those
who learned about color-blindness.281
273

Samuel R. Sommers, supra note __.
Id.
275
Recall that in Prichard and Keenan’s study, jury deliberation barely helped correct
individual memory errors. While Sommers did not employ a methodology designed to test
the statistical significance of memory error correction generally, his study raises the
possibility that diverse juries (which were not reported and presumably not tested by
Pritchard and Keenan) might have a unique ability to correct more memory errors than
homogeneous juries. Such a theory should be tested empirically. See Prichard & Keenan,
supra note __; Sommers, supra note __.
276
Id. at 22-30.
277
Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 668
(2002) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
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Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard A. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism
Versus Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004).
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Id. at __. The learning process included reading about multiculturalism or colorblindness as well as writing about it.
280
Id. at 420.
281
Id.
274

25-Aug-06

Forgotten Equality

57

A study by Rudman and her colleagues tested the effects of a diversity
education program and found similar results to Richeson and Nussbaum,
indicating that learning the values of diversity can at least temporarily reduce
implicit stereotypes.282 In that study, participants voluntarily attended a
diversity and conflict seminar, during which they learned about inter-group
conflict, engaged in discussions, and kept a journal.283 Participants were given
IAT tests both prior to and after the semester. Results indicated that students in
the diversity and conflict seminar reduced both their implicit (as measured by
the IAT) and explicit racial biases, while those in the control group (who
received no diversity training) did not.284 These studies indicate that diversity
or multiculturalism training could potentially help juries reduce implicit racial
biases. Yet implementing a mandatory diversity course, for example, could
risk backfiring if jurors became angry about being required to participate (an
emotion that could be common considering that people are often unaware of
their implicit biases). Thus, before implementing training, further research
should be conducted to test what types of training programs would be tolerated
by jurors without backlash.285 One possibility is that diversity training would
perhaps generate less resistance by jurors if it were a component of a larger
juror education or training program.
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Laurie A. Rudman et al., Unlearning Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001). The
researchers did point to evidence, however, that forced compliance with “pro-Black”
requests can result in anger and backlash. Id. at 857, (citing E. A. Plant & Patricia G.
Devine, Responses to Other Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash? 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 486 (2001)).
283
Id. at 858. Other participants, who were in the control group, were enrolled in a
research methods course. It is interesting to note that (in the first experiment conducted)
participants in the training group were taught by an African American professor while
participants in the control group were taught by a Caucasian professor. Thus, effects
generated between the two groups might have emerged from effects similar to those
demonstrated by Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note __. The experimenters corrected this
potential confound in experiment 2 by having the same African-American professor teach
the control group’s course. Results in experiment 2 indicated the same bias-reduction
results as in experiment 1—for the experimental group but not for the control group. Id. at
863-864.
284
Id. at 860-861.
285
Jury training has been suggested in other contexts. See, e.g. James J. Gobert, In
Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 326 (1988) (suggesting
implement juror “impartiality training”); Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The
Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and Legal
Decisionmaking, 66 B.U.L. REV. 771 (1986); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 133 (2002) (discussing training effectiveness generally and
applying it to judges).
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One theory behind diversity training and multiculturalism, that increasing
an understanding of out-group members will lead to reduction in prejudice (in
the language of intergroup contact theory-- “familiarity breeds liking”286), is
supported by a large volume of work.287 This work reaffirms that exposure to
people across groups acts to reduce biases, particularly under optimal
conditions.
A meta-analysis by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp
demonstrated that across hundreds of studies, intergroup contact does in fact
lead to prejudice reduction.288 The researchers found that intergroup contact
that comported with Allport’s 1954 formulation of “optimal contact” displayed
the most prejudice reduction. These optimal contact conditions include: equal
status; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authority,
such as the law.289 Interestingly, Allport’s optimal conditions appear to
describe the mandate, function, and process of juries. Thus, the possibility is
raised not only that diverse juries may display less prejudice (as investigated by
Sommers290), but also that the experience of being on a diverse jury itself could
lead to less future prejudice.291
2. Improving Memory Accuracy and Reducing False Memories.
Two different styles of memory improvement efforts might help mitigate
the effects of implicit memory bias. First, research on reducing memory errors
offers clues about how jury instructions or other debiasing measures might help
mitigate memory inaccuracies. These projects often suggest that implementing
“late stage correction” strategies can reduce some memory errors, although the
reduction of stereotype related memory errors has proved particularly
challenging. Second, practical solutions such as juror note-taking and
question-asking can help improve memory retention in the legal process.
Though these strategies have not been investigated with regard to racial
memory biases, they offer hope that general memory improvement will help
reduce racially biased errors.
In light of the compelling evidence linking false memory generation to
stereotypes, researchers have begun exploring ways to try to moderate the
potentially harmful effects of stereotype-consistent false memories. These
efforts have yielded mixed success and serve as a reminder that trying to
286
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Id. at 752, citing GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). The metaanalysis indicated that these conditions are best viewed as a “bundle” (meaning that they
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reduce the harmful effects of stereotypes is a difficult process. Keith Payne
and his colleagues examined whether instructing participants to respond to
memory tasks based on their confidence levels might help reduce stereotypeconsistent false memories. 292 If stereotype-consistent false memories emerge
only when people make guesses, they hypothesized, then instructing people to
only answer when they are subjectively confident in their memory should
eliminate stereotype-consistent false memories.293 The results of the study
indicated that giving such instructions helped improve general memory
accuracy, but did not reduce the amount of stereotype consistent false
memories. In fact, participants were just as likely to display stereotypeconsistent false memories when they expressed 100% certainty in their
memory judgments as when they expressed zero certainty.294 Encouraging
jurors to rely on their memory confidence levels, then, appears to be a less than
promising way of reducing memory errors. The study also raises the concern
that taking steps to improve general memory accuracy, as I propose elsewhere,
will not necessarily lead to reduction in stereotype-consistent memory errors.
Late-Correction Memory Strategies. A study by Marsh and his colleagues
provides a little more optimism for generating a legal process response to
implicit memory bias. Such a response might involve de-stereotyping tasks in
connection with jury instructions to reduce stereotype-consistent false
memories. Marsh and his colleagues found that using conscious memory
control processes may reduce people’s reliance on stereotypes in making
source attributions.
Participants viewed a series of gender-stereotype
consistent statements (such as “I made a centerpiece for the dining table”)
along with the gender neutral name of the person who made the statement.295
After a distraction task, the gender and sexual orientation of the people who
made the statements was revealed. Participants were then asked to recall who
made the statements. Results indicated that source attribution errors were
consistently influenced by gender and sexual orientation stereotype. For
example, participants over-attributed stereotypically male statements to
heterosexual males and homosexual females.
The experimenters next tested whether “late correction” memory strategies
might reduce or eliminate the source attribution bias. Before responding to the
292

B. Keith Payne et al., Memory Monitoring and the Control of Stereotype Distortion,
40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 52 (2004).
293
Id. at 54. In part I of experiment, participants performed a memory test in which
participants studied a list of “Black” and “White” names (those typically associated with
Black or White individuals), which were randomly grouped together with one of two
occupations (basketball player or politician). As in other studies described, results for this
test indicated the expected stereotype-consistent false memories.
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Id. at 58.
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recall task, participants were told to list reasons why they believed stereotypes
were harmful in today’s society.296 Implementing this simple task reduced
some but not all source attribution errors. For example, participants became
more accurate in attributing masculine stereotyped statements to homosexual
males.297 The moderate success in correcting stereotype-consistent source
attribution errors indicates that late correction memory strategies hold promise
for reducing legal errors based on stereotypes. In keeping with “late stage”
delivery, these correction strategies could be implemented simultaneously with
jury instructions.298 However, practical problems might arise in the jury
context with a de-stereotyping task that requires jurors to make a list about the
harms of stereotypes in order to effectively debias. Yet it is too early to rule
out any solutions, even potentially impractical ones.
Juror Note-taking and Question Asking. Another type of memory debiasing
takes advantage of procedural tasks such as note-taking to combat memory
errors. One of the more popular arguments in support of juror note-taking is
the common-sense expectation that note-taking allows jurors to refresh their
memories.299 Benefits of note-taking have been verified empirically. In one
such study, Horwitz and ForsterLee found that mock jurors who were allowed
to take notes during a mock trial did a better job of assessing relevant factual
information, including distinguishing between the deservingness of recovery of
various plaintiffs.300 This increased accuracy level exceeded much smaller
improvements shown by mock-jurors who did not take notes but had transcript
access.301
Because decisions regarding note-taking are made by the trial judge,302
keeping track of statistics on the prevalence of juror note-taking is difficult. If
the vast majority of courts already allow or even encourage note-taking, then
suggesting note-taking reforms becomes superfluous. Studies, however, reveal
296

In keeping with the late stage correction theory, participants made this list between
viewing the statements and recalling who made the statements. Id.
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Id. at 157. However, the instruction did not significantly reduce source attributions
relying upon the “masculine” stereotype of homosexual females and only slightly reduced
the number of total attribution errors made.
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Other commentators concerned with juror information processing inefficiencies
have argued for debiasing instructions. Prescott & Starr, supra note __ at 342 (stating that
such debiasing instructions can “hardly hurt”). The efforts I propose could be combined
with such efforts.
299
Douglas Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997)
300
Irwin A. Horowitz & Lynne ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking and Trial
Transcript Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
373 (2001).
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Id. at 387.
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Smith, supra note __ at 568.
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mixed results.
A 1988 survey by Heuer and Penrod indicated that
approximately one-third of trial judges allow note-taking at trial.303 More
recent projects have pointed to a trend in allowing note-taking, even calling the
practice “widespread.”304 Whatever the true estimate, judge-encouraged juror
note-taking appears to be needed still.
In addition to their calls for juror note-taking reform, scholars concerned
about juror memory errors and cognitive load outside of the implicit bias
context have called for additional reforms such as question asking (where
jurors may submit questions to the judge during trial) and transcript access.305
These scholars have pointed out that “active juror” reforms improve juror
information processing and self-monitoring.306 Encouraging wider-scale notetaking, question asking and transcript access might reduce implicit memory
bias by bolstering overall memory accuracy. However, to date there is no
evidence that these steps reduce particular memory errors, generation of false
memories, or stereotype-consistent memory bias. Further research should be
conducted to determine whether these procedural steps, perhaps in combination
with late stage memory control techniques (as implemented by Marsh and his
colleagues) can help reduce implicit memory biases. Researchers must also
continue to investigate strategies to reduce or temporarily eliminate stereotypeconsistent memory errors. Studies in this area have not been as successful as
hoped, leading some researchers to conclude that the best way to change
stereotype-consistent false memories is to change the stereotypes
themselves.307
3. Future Directions.
The ways in which implicit biases can be moderated and memory errors
reduced provide hope for bias reduction and demonstrate the continued
importance of future research. The research I have described indicates that
although much progress has been made, greater efforts are needed. Implicit
303
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racial biases are elicited quickly and easily, and can only be temporarily
reduced through interventional approaches. Biased memory errors, too, have
resisted correction. While general memory has been shown to improve with
procedural measures, researchers are only beginning to understand how
stereotype-consistent memory errors might be reduced. The effort in both of
these areas must continue so that a comprehensive legal model of implicit
memory bias-reducing interventions can be developed.
VI. CONCLUSION
How can the American legal system stand for justice and fairness when it
embraces a decision-making process that propagates racial bias? The
automatic and pervasive nature of implicit memory biases highlights the
difficulty of finding a solution for this moral and practical conundrum. As I
have argued, the only surefire solution for implicit memory bias is cultural
change. When racial stereotypes no longer disproportionately link minorities
to negative traits, implicit memory biases will disappear. In the meantime,
however, some important temporary measures may help lessen the harmful
racial effects of implicit memory biases. Nonetheless, more research is needed.
This research will continue to inform us as to the nature of memory biases
themselves and to ameliorating efforts that will aid the battle against biases in
legal decision-making. Research should also be conducted across legal
disciplines to determine the pervasiveness of implicit memory biases. These
projects might include examinations of decision-making processes in areas
such as employment discrimination, property ownership, death penalty,
intellectual property, and more.
Although the legal decision-making implications are challenging enough,
implicit memory biases have implications beyond the legal system. If they are
as pervasive as the research tends to indicate, they may effect decisions big and
small—from committees deciding which applicant to admit or job seeker to
hire (perhaps misremembering qualifications) to a donor deciding how much
money to donate to a charity (perhaps misremembering reputation or past
performance). Future research should thus be conducted not only within the
legal setting. Only through these projects can we begin to fashion a
sophisticated legal response to the harms caused. In the meantime, however, so
long as implicit biases go unchecked in legal decision-making, we cannot be
confident that social justice is at hand.

Appendix A- Dependent Variable Measures
Below is a list of facts. Some of the facts below accurately describe the case you read.
Other facts below do not accurately describe the case you read. Please circle “Y” (for
“yes”) next to the facts that are accurately reported from the case. If a fact does not
accurately describe the information you read, or if the fact was not in the case at all,
circle “N” (for “no”).
1) James smiled at William after spilling beer on him.
Y/N
2) William and his friend hit James one time each.
Y/N
3) William and James first encountered each other in a bar.
Y/N
4) William wore a tee shirt and jeans.
Y/N
5) After James said “Let it go,” William replied by saying “What if we won’t let it
go?”
Y/N
6) William hit James in the face immediately after James shoved William’s friend.
Y/N
7) After being punched, James took out an object from his pocket. Y/N
8) Before going to the bar, William and his friend ate at a local diner. Y/N
9) James worked as a plumber.
Y/N
10) William punched James from behind.
Y/N
11) William and his friend followed James as he left the bar. Y/N
12) After James fell to the ground, William kicked him.
Y/N
13) When William hit James in the face, he was really trying to push him rather than
punch him.
Y/N
14) When they saw him outside a diner, William and his friend approached James.
Y/N
15) William was angry that James had spilled beer on him in the bar. Y/N
16) James shoved William.
Y/N

Appendix A (continued)
Below is a list of facts. Some of the facts below accurately describe the case you read.
Other facts below do not accurately describe the case you read. Please circle “Y” (for
“yes”) next to the facts that are accurately reported from the case. If a fact does not
accurately describe the information you read, or if the fact was not in the case at all,
circle “N” (for “no”).
1) Brenda worked as a marketing clerk.
Y/N
2) Brenda was named employee of the month.
Y/N
3) Brenda’s employment contract stated that she should not be terminated without good
cause.
Y/N
4) Brenda had permission to use her computer for personal use, so long as it occurred
during her fifteen minute breaks.
Y/N
5) Brenda frequently surfed the web.
Y/N
6) Brenda always completed her assigned work.
Y/N
7) Brenda’s internet blog generated publicity and created new business. Y/N
8) Brenda worked for “Big Burger Company.”
Y/N
9) Brenda’s employment contract stated that she could be terminated if she failed to
comply with the employee handbook.
Y/N
10) Brenda liked hamburgers but not french fries.
Y/N
11) Brenda used her phone to make personal long-distance calls.
Y/N
12) Brenda was allowed a one hour lunch break.
Y/N
13) Brenda was occasionally sloppy in her work.
Y/N
14) Brenda worked longer hours than was required.
Y/N
15) Brenda posted a blog complaining about the company’s burgers.
Y/N
16) Brenda received mixed reviews from superiors.
Y/N

Appendix B- Individual Recall Results:
Aggression Example 1: “When they saw him outside a diner, William and his friend
approached James.”
Accurate Fact?
No
Yes

African American/ Hawaiian
7
91

Caucasian
10
44

Aggression Example 2: “Tyronne punched James from behind.”
Accurate Fact?
No
Yes

African American
21
30

Caucasian
31
23

Hawaiian
31
17

Aggression Example 3 (False Memory): “After James said ‘Let it go,’ Tyronne replied by
saying ‘What if we won’t let it go?’”
Accurate Fact?
No
Yes

African American/ Hawaiian
29
69

Caucasian
24
30

Mitigation Example 4 (False Memory): “James shoved Kawika.”
Accurate Fact?
No
Yes

Hawaiian
12
36

Caucasian
23
31

African American
24
27

Employment Example 5 (False Memory): “Brenda was named Employee of the Month.”
Accurate Fact?
No
Yes

Hawaiian
47
1

Caucasian
45
9

African American
45
5

